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A noncitizen who has been convicted of a "particularlyserious crime" can
be deported to a country where there is a greater thanfifty percent chance of
persecution or death. Yet, the Board ofImmigrationAppeals has notprovided a
clear test for determining what is a "particularlyserious crime." The current
test, which combines an examinationof the elements with afact-specific inquiry,
has led to arbitraryand unpredictable decisions about what types of offenses
are "particularlyserious." This Article argues that the categoricalapproach
for analyzing convictions should be applied to the particularlyserious crime
determination to promote greater uniformity and provide the predictability
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necessary to make informedpleas. Recent Supreme Court decisions, as well as
a 2015 opinion by the Attorney General,support this argument by stressingthat
the use of the word "convicted" in the Immigrationand NationalityAct triggers
a categorical analysis. Although the United Nations High Commissionerfor
Refugees has interpreted the particularly serious crime bar as requiring an
individualizedanalysis, this Article argues that the categoricalapproachbetter
protects the High Commissioner's underlying concerns of consistency and
fairness.
INTRODUCTION

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), a noncitizen facing
deportation who demonstrates a greater than fifty percent chance of persecution
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion may be eligible for a form of relief called "withholding of
removal." ' The Refugee Act of 1980 incorporated withholding of removal into
the INA in order to comply with the international obligation of nonrefoulement
under the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (the "Refugee
Convention" and the "Protocol," respectively). 2 This obligation prohibits the
United States from sending someone to a country where her life or freedom
would be threatened. 3 There are, however, certain exceptions to this prohibition.
If it is determined that "the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of
a particularly serious crime is a danger to the community of the United States,"
then the person is barred from withholding of removal and ordered deported
despite a potentially serious risk of persecution or death. 4 This statutory
provision mirrors the language of the Refugee Convention and is commonly
known as the "particularly serious crime" bar.5
The test currently used by the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") to
determine whether the particularly serious crime bar applies combines an
examination of the elements of a crime with an inquiry into some of the
individualized facts. 6 This approach is inconsistent with the categorical
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2) (2017) (outlining the "more
likely than not" standard).
2 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of
8 U.S.C.); H.R. REP. No. 96-608, at 17-18 (1979); see also Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223 [hereinafter Protocol]; Convention Relating to the
Statute of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 140 U.N.T.S. 1954 [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
3 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2).
4 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (emphasis added).
I See Refugee Convention, supra note 2, at 176 (indicating that the right to remain in the
country due to fear of prosecution is inapplicable if "there are reasonable grounds for
regarding as a danger to the security of the country... having been convicted by a final
judgment of a particularly serious crime").
6 See In re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336, 342 (B.I.A. 2007).
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approach for analyzing convictions, which focuses on the elements of the crime.
Several recent Supreme Court decisions have addressed the categorical
approach, clarifying various splits among the courts of appeals regarding how
this approach should be applied and emphasizing the importance of the statutory
term "convicted" in triggering a categorical analysis. 7 In light of these decisions,
an April 2015 opinion by Attorney General Eric Holder vacated an earlier
decision by Attorney General Michael Mukasey that had permitted departures
from the categorical approach for crimes involving moral turpitude ("CIMTs");
CIMTs are both a ground of deportability and a bar to certain forms of relief
from removal under the INA.8 The new opinion underscores that the word
"convicted" requires examining the elements of a crime rather than the
9
underlying facts.
This Article argues that the categorical approach should also be applied to the
particularly serious crime bar, which uses the word "convicted" but, strikingly,
has never been subject to this analysis. The BIA has stated in dicta that the
categorical approach does not apply to the particularly serious crime
determination because the latter is discretionary.10 Yet appellate courts have not
consistently treated this determination as discretionary, nor have most of them
explicitly addressed the question of whether the statutory language requires a
categorical analysis in light of recent Supreme Court cases." Thus, there
remains an open legal question about whether the categorical approach should
be applied to the particularly serious crime bar. Furthermore, even if courts
decide that a categorical analysis is not required,this Article argues that the BIA
should adopt this approach in order to promote uniformity and predictability.
Part I of this Article explains the categorical approach, discussing the
significance of the statutory term "convicted" under recent Supreme Court
decisions and in the Matter of Silva-Trevino. Part I then discusses the BIA's
current test for determining whether the particularly serious crime bar applies
and how that test emphasizes the elements of an offense, yet deviates from the
categorical approach. One of the main problems with the current test is that the

I See, e.g., Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2279 (2013); Moncrieffe v. Holder,
133 S. Ct. 1678, 1690 (2013) ("[T]he relevant INA provisions ask what the noncitizen was
'convicted of,' not what he did, and the inquiry in immigration proceedings is limited
accordingly."); Kawashima v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1166, 1172 (2012) (analyzing whether the
defendants' actions involved fraud or deceit through the categorical approach and looking at
the definition of the crime in the statute rather than "the specific facts underlying the crime");
Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 579-80 (2010) (focusing on the importance of
the actual conviction as "the relevant statutory hook").
8 See generallyIn re Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. 550 (Att'y Gen. 2015) (rejecting the
approach of Attorney General Mukasey which allowed judges to consider information outside
of the categorical approach when there was a conviction potentially involving moral
turpitude).

9Id.
10N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 344-45.

11 See infra Section LB.
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BIA has never identified specific elements that are required for a conviction to
constitute a particularly serious crime. Another critical issue is that the BIA's
test allows, but does not require, immigration judges to look at the underlying
facts and circumstances; this leads to ad hoc decisions about whether to base the
particularly serious crime determination on the elements alone or on a
combination of elements and facts.
Part II of this Article examines the argument that our international obligation
of nonrefoulement calls for an individualized analysis. The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR"), the U.N. agency in charge of
implementing the Refugee Convention and Protocol, has interpreted the
particularly serious crime bar as requiring an individualized approach that takes
into consideration all mitigating and aggravating factors. This Part explains that
the BIA's current approach does not comport with UNHCR's interpretation any
more than it complies with the categorical approach. Specifically, the BIA has
parted ways with UNHCR by refusing to apply the principle of proportionality;
rejecting dangerousness as a distinct requirement; and excluding certain
individualized facts from consideration, such as offender characteristics,
evidence of rehabilitation, and the role of mental illness in a crime.
Part III of this Article explores three possible paths forward in interpreting the
particularly serious crime bar: (1) applying the categorical approach, (2)
applying a categorical analysis to the conviction combined with a fact-specific
inquiry into dangerousness, and (3) applying a completely individualized
analysis. This Article contends that the categorical approach, while imperfect, is
the best option, as it addresses UNHCR's underlying concerns related to
consistency and fairness better than a highly subjective, individualized analysis.
This Article also proposes specific elements to define a "particularly serious
crime," arguing that careful selection of these elements can help ensure that the
conviction itself demonstrates dangerousness and that the principle of
proportionality is upheld. This approach would make the categorical approach
more consistent with UNHCR's interpretation than the BIA's current test. Given
the gravity of being deported to a country where there is a serious risk of
persecution or death, a principled, predictable approach to the particularly
serious crime bar is necessary.
I.

THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH

Courts have long applied the "categorical approach" in determining whether
a given conviction triggers a ground of deportability or a bar to relief from
removal under the INA. Judicial decisions dating back to 1913 employ this
approach in analyzing immigration laws. 12 Under the categorical approach, a
court is concerned with the statute of conviction, not the facts of the underlying
12 Alina Das,

The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting
Categorical Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1688-702, 1749-52
(2011); see also Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1685 ("This categorical approach has a long

pedigree in our Nation's immigration law.").
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offense. The court compares the elements required for conviction under the state
statute with the "generic" offense, which is the way the crime is "commonly
understood;" 13 the offense "must be viewed in the abstract, to see whether the
state statute shares the nature of the federal offense that serves as a point of
comparison."' 14 A categorical match exists only if the state statute requires all of
the elements of the generic federal offense for a conviction. 15 The6 actual conduct
involved in the offense is completely irrelevant to the analysis.'
If there is no categorical match, that is usually the end of the analysis, and the
ground of deportability or bar to relief is not triggered. The Supreme Court
recently clarified that only when a statute is divisible-i.e., where it lists
multiple alternative elements thereby including several different crimes-does
the analysis continue beyond the categorical approach. 17 In this situation, an
immigration judge must use the "modified categorical approach" to consult a
limited set of documents-the record of conviction-to identify the crime of
conviction in order to compare it to the generic offense. The record of conviction
includes charging documents, any plea agreement or colloquy, any jury
instructions, the verdict, and the sentence.' 8 A court may not consider other
documents such as, for example, arrest reports, witness statements, or any other
evidence related to the offense. 19 Upon consulting the record of conviction,
"[t]he court can then do what the categorical approach demands: compare the
elements of the crime of conviction (including the alternative element used in
the case) with the elements of the generic crime." 20 Thus, the modified approach
"acts not as an exception, but instead as a tool" that "retains the categorical
approach's central feature: a focus on the elements, rather than the facts, of a
crime."'21 Because the modified categorical approach is really just a way to
implement the categorical approach, this Article uses the term "categorical
approach" as shorthand for the combination of these approaches.

13 Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013).
14 Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1684.
15 Id.
16 Id.

Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285.
Id. at 2296 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 144
I8
(2010) (stating that a court can consider "charging documents, plea agreements, transcripts of
plea colloquies, findings of fact and conclusions of law from a bench trial, and jury
instructions and verdict forms"); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 20-21 (2005)
(indicating that when there is a generic conviction, the court could consider charging
documents filed and recorded judicial acts, such as jury instructions).
19 Johnson, 559 U.S. at 144 (limiting the factual inquiry to only "the trial record").
20 Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281.
'7

21 Id. at 2285.
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A. The Significance of the Word "Convicted"
Several recent decisions by the Supreme Court addressing the categorical
approach have emphasized that the use of the word "convicted" plays a critical
role in triggering this mode of analysis. In Carachuri-Rosendov. Holder,22 the
Court considered whether a lawful permanent resident who had lived in the
United States since he was five years old was barred from a form of relief called
cancellation of removal based on an "aggravated felony" conviction under the
INA. 23 Jose Angel Carachuri-Rosendo had been convicted of two misdemeanor
drug-possession offenses under Texas law. 24 The first conviction was for
possession of less than two ounces of marijuana, which resulted in a twenty-day
jail sentence, and the second conviction was for possession of a single Xanax
pill without a prescription, which resulted in a ten-day jail sentence. 25 The issue
was whether the second conviction fell under the aggravated felony ground for
"illicit trafficking in a controlled substance. . . including a drug trafficking
crime (as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18)."26 The federal statute cited
defines "drug trafficking crime" to include "any felony punishable under the
Controlled Substances Act."'27 The BIA and the Fifth Circuit both found that the
second simple drug possession offense in this case was an aggravated felony
under the INA because the conduct-recidivist simple possessionhypothetically could have been punished as a felony had it been prosecuted in
28
federal court under the Controlled Substances Act.
In rejecting this reasoning, the Supreme Court stressed that the statutory bar
to cancellation of removal requires the lawful permanent resident to have "been
convicted of a[n] aggravated felony."2 9 Based on the plain language of the
statute, the Court reasoned that: "The text ...indicates that we are to look to the
conviction itself as our starting place, not to what might have or could have been
charged. '30 Because the prosecutor had never actually charged CarachuriRosendo with the existence of the prior simple possession, he was not actually
convicted of a drug possession committed after a prior conviction had become
final. 31 In finding that an immigration judge could not rely on uncharged facts,
32
the Court stressed that the conviction is "the relevant statutory hook.

22 560 U.S. 563 (2010).
23 Id.at 563.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 570-71.

26 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2012).
27 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) (2012).
28 Carachuri-Rosendo,560 U.S. at 572-73.
29 Id.at 576 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3)).
30 Id.
31 Id.at 582.
32 Id.at 580.
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The Supreme Court's 2013 decision in Moncrieffe v. Holder33 applied the
reasoning of Carachuri-Rosendo in considering whether a conviction for
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute under a Georgia statute
constituted an aggravated felony under the INA. 34 Adrian Moncrieffe was
caught with 1.3 grams of marijuana in his car-the equivalent of two or three
marijuana cigarettes--during a traffic stop. 35 The Court held that if a conviction
for marijuana distribution fails to establish that the offense involved either
remuneration or more than a small amount of marijuana, it is not an aggravated
felony under the INA. 36 Once again, the Court stressed that "the relevant INA
he did, and the
provisions ask what the noncitizen was 'convicted of,' not what
37
inquiry in immigration proceedings is limited accordingly.
In Moncrieffe, the Court rejected the Government's proposal that noncitizens
"be given an opportunity during immigration proceedings to demonstrate that
their predicate marijuana distribution convictions involved only a small amount
of marijuana and no remuneration, just as a federal criminal defendant could do
at sentencing. '38 The Court explained that the Government's proposal "would
require precisely the sort of post hoc investigation into the facts of predicate
offenses that we have long deemed undesirable." 39 The Court emphasized that
"[t]he categorical approach serves 'practical' purposes: It promotes judicial and
administrative efficiency by precluding the relitigation of past convictions in
minitrials conducted long after the fact." 40 Under the Government's proposal,
"two noncitizens, each 'convicted of' the same offense, might obtain different
aggravated felony determinations depending on what evidence remains
available or how it is perceived by an individual immigration judge," which the
"potential unfairness" that the
Court described as precisely the type of
41
categorical approach was designed to avoid.
Just two months after issuing its decision in Moncrieffe, the Supreme Court
issued its opinion in Descamps v. United States,42 also addressing the categorical
approach but arising under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA") instead
of the INA. 43 Descamps resolved a circuit split by holding that the modified
categorical approach only applies to divisible statutes.44 The Court found that
the modified categorical approach does not apply to California's burglary
33 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013).
34 Id. at 1687.
31 Id. at 1683.
17

Id. at 1680.
Id. at 1690 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1229b(a)(3) (2012)).

38

Id.

36

39 Id.
40 Id. (citing Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 125 (2009)).
41
42

41
44

Id.
133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013).

Id. at 2281.
Id. at 2279.
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statute, which is missing the element of unlawful entry that is required for a
generic federal burglary offense. 45 The Court explained that a jury must find
facts about a defendant's underlying conduct unanimously and beyond a
reasonable doubt, "[a]nd the only facts the court can be sure the jury so found
are those constituting elements of the offense-as distinct from amplifying but
legally extraneous circumstances. '46 The Court noted that a defendant "often has
little incentive to contest facts that are not elements of the charged offense-and
may have good reason not to," because extraneous facts and arguments may just
confuse the jury at trial or "irk the prosecutor or court" during plea hearings. 47
In addition, the Court was concerned about "depriv[ing] some defendants of
the benefits of their negotiated plea deals. '48 The Court reasoned that if a
defendant surrenders his right to trial in exchange for the Government's
agreement that he plead guilty to a less serious crime, it would be unfair to later
treat the defendant as if he had pled guilty to the original charge, since that would
be letting a court "rewrite the parties' bargain. '49 Because the California
burglary statute under which Matthew Descamps was convicted did not require
the factfmder to determine whether there was an unlawful entry, the Supreme
Court held that a conviction under that statute is never for generic burglary and
that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had erred in "look[ing] behind
Descamps' conviction in search of record evidence that he actually committed
the generic offense." 50
The Supreme Court also addressed the categorical approach in its 2012
decision in Kawashima v. Holder,5 1 which involved the aggravated felony
provision under the INA pertaining to a conviction that "involves fraud or deceit
in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000.52 Akio Kawashima
had been convicted of filing a materially false corporate tax return, and his wife,
Fusako Kawashima, had been convicted of knowingly and willfully assisting
him. 53 In determining whether their convictions necessarily "involve[d] fraud or
deceit," the Court employed the categorical approach, explaining that "[i]f the
elements of the offenses establish that the Kawashimas committed crimes
involving fraud or deceit, then [the clause] is satisfied. '54 Because the elements
of the crimes of conviction required the document to be false as to a material
45 Id. at 2280-81.

46 Id. at 2288.
47 Id. at 2289.
48 Id.
49 Id.

50 Id. at 2293.
51 132 S. Ct. 1166 (2012).
52 Id. at 1170-71 (emphasis added); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(43)(M)(i) (2012); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) ("Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after
admission is deportable.").

13 Kawashima, 132 S. Ct. at 1172-73.
54 Id. at 1172.
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matter and the defendant to have acted willfully, the Court found that the
even though the words "fraud"
convictions necessarily involved fraud or deceit,
55
or "deceit" did not appear in the statutory text.
The decision in Kawashima,along with the other cases discussed above, cast
doubt on a 2008 opinion issued by Attorney General Mukasey in the Matter of
56
Silva-Trevino ("Silva-Trevino P'), which addressed how to determine if a
noncitizen had been "convicted of... a crime involving moral turpitude" under
the INA. 57 This moral turpitude provision used the word "involve," just like the
aggravated felony ground addressed in Kawashima. But, unlike the Supreme
Court, the Attorney General's opinion had permitted the BIA and immigration
judges to go beyond the categorical and modified categorical approaches and
look at evidence outside58the record of conviction to determine if the crime
involved moral turpitude.
In April 2015, Attorney General Holder vacated the 2008 decision in SilvaTrevino I in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Kawashima, CarachuriRosendo, and Moncrieffe. 59 By that time, a circuit split had already developed
about whether the approach set forth in Silva-Trevino I deserved deference from
the federal appellate courts. 60 The five appellate courts that had rejected SilvaTrevino Is approach stressed that Congress's use of the word "convicted" in the
statutory phrase "convicted ...of a crime involving moral turpitude" prohibited
immigration judges from inquiring into relevant evidence outside the record of
conviction. 61 In his April 2015 opinion ("Silva-Trevino I'), Attorney General
"reaffirmed that the
Holder also recognized that recent Supreme Court decisions
'62
phrase 'convicted of required a categorical approach."
55Id.at 1172-73.
24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 689 (Att'y Gen. 2008), overruled by 26 I. & N. Dec. 550 (Att'y
Gen. 2015).
578 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) (emphasis added); Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 689.
58 Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 704.
'9Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 553.
60Id.(commenting that one reason for reevaluating the 2008 decision was because of the
disagreement among the circuits); see also Silva-Trevino v. Holder, 742 F.3d 197, 200-06
(5th Cir. 2014) (rejecting the Attorney General's opinion and finding that the statute was not
ambiguous); Olivas-Motta v. Holder, 746 F.3d 907, 911-16 (9th Cir. 2014) (as amended)
(same); Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 480-84 (4th Cir. 2012) (same); Fajardo v. U.S.
Att'y Gen., 659 F.3d 1303, 1307-11 (11th Cir. 2011) (same); Jean-Louis v. U.S. Att'y Gen.,
582 F.3d 462, 472-82 (3d Cir. 2009) (same). But see Bobadilla v. Holder, 679 F.3d 1052,
1057-58 (8th Cir. 2012) (giving deference to the Attorney General's interpretation and
remanding for a determination under that standard); Mata-Guerrero v. Holder, 627 F.3d 256,
260-61 (7th Cir. 2010) (same).
61 Silva-Trevino, 742 F.3d at 200-01, 201 n.1; see also Pooja R. Dadhania, Note, The
Categorical Approach for Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude After Silva-Trevino, 111
COLUM. L. REv. 313, 340-46 (2011) (discussing the circuit split that resulted from SilvaTrevino and arguing for a uniform categorical approach to safeguard noncitizens).
62 Silva-Trevino, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 553.
56
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Subsequently, in June 2015, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Mellouli

v. Lynch 63 and applied the categorical approach in determining whether a Kansas

conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia constituted a controlled
substance conviction under the INA. 64 The only piece of "paraphernalia" in that
case was a sock that contained a few unidentified tablets. 65 After discussing the
origins of the categorical approach, the Court stressed that it is "[riooted in
Congress' specification of conviction, not conduct, as the trigger for
immigration consequences. ' 66 The Court also highlighted the practical benefits

of the categorical approach, noting that it is "suited to the realities of the
system." 67 Relying on two excellent scholarly articles by Alina Das and Jennifer
Koh, the Court explained that immigration judges are overloaded with cases, and
that the categorical approach promotes efficiency, fairness, and predictability.
The categorical approach allows noncitizens to anticipate the consequence of a
conviction and thereby enter into "safe harbor" pleas that do not expose them to
68
the risk of removal.
These decisions all emphasize that the use of the word "convicted" triggers
the categorical approach when interpreting the criminal grounds of deportability
and bars to relief from removal in the INA. But there is one striking exception:
the categorical approach has not been applied in analyzing whether a noncitizen
has been "convicted" of a "particularly serious crime," which is a bar to both
asylum and withholding of removal. 69 The following Section provides some
basic background information about this bar and then explains how the BIA's
approach to the particularly serious crime determination deviates from a
categorical analysis.
B.

Convictionfor a "ParticularlySerious Crime"

A noncitizen who satisfies the definition of a refugee by demonstrating a wellfounded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion can still be deported
to his or her home country if it is determined that "the alien, having been
convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime is a danger to the
community of the United States. ' 70 The particularly serious crime bar applies to
63 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015).
64 Id.at 1983-84.
65 Id.at 1984.

66Id.at 1986 (emphasis added).
67

Id.

68 Id. at 1986-87 (citing Das, supra note 12, at 1725-42, 1737-78; Jennifer Lee Koh, The
Whole Better than the Sum: A Case for the Categorical Approach to Determining the
Immigration Consequences of Crime, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 295 (2012)).
69 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2012) (refusing to grant asylum to aliens convicted of a
particularly serious crime); 8 U.S.C. § 123 l(b)(3)(B)(ii) (describing withholding of removal
for aliens convicted of a particularly serious crime).
708 U.S.C. § 123 l(b)(3)(B)(ii) (emphasis added).
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71
both asylum and withholding of removal. These are similar forms of relief, but
there are some important differences.
While asylum is discretionary, withholding of removal is mandatory,
reflecting the obligation of nonrefoulement under the Refugee Convention and
Protocol. 72 To obtain withholding of removal, a noncitizen must demonstrate a
higher likelihood of future persecution if deported than for asylum. Asylum
requires only a reasonable chance of future persecution, which can be a ten
percent chance, but withholding of removal requires a greater than fifty percent
73
chance of future persecution, setting a much higher standard. In 2014,
immigration courts granted only twelve percent of applications for withholding
74
of removal, compared to forty-nine percent for asylum. One advantage of
withholding of removal is that there is no deadline to apply, whereas an asylum
application must normally be filed within one year of entering the United
States. 75 The major disadvantage of withholding of removal is that, unlike
asylum, it does not put someone on a path to lawful permanent residency and
citizenship. 76 It simply prevents deportation to the country of feared persecution
77
and makes the person eligible for a work permit. If someone who has been
United States, he or she will
granted withholding of removal travels outside the
78
country.
the
reenter
to
which
with
have no status

71Id. (describing withholding of removal); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) ("[T]he

alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a
danger to the community of the United States." (emphasis added)).
72 See INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 332 (1992) ("Because of the mandatory nature of the
withholding-of-deportation provision, the Attorney General's power to deny withholding
claims differs significantly from his broader authority to administer discretionary forms of
").
relief such as asylum ....
73 Compare 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2) (2017) (applying the "more likely than not" standard
to withholding of removal), with INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,440 (1987) (holding
that even a ten percent chance of future persecution is a reasonable possibility that satisfies
the standard for asylum).
74 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ExEc. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REvIEw, FY 2014 STATISTICS
(2015),
K5
KI,
at
YEARBOOK,
2
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/pages/attachments/ 0 15/03/1 6/fyl4syb.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2VV-65VX]. Asylum applications that were filed affirmatively with the
Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS")
and then referred to immigration court had a grant rate of seventy-five percent in 2014,
compared to a grant rate of just twenty-eight percent for asylum applications filed with the
immigration court defensively. Id.at K3. The forty-nine percent overall grant rate includes
asylum applications in both categories.
71 See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a); see also Oroh v. Holder, 561 F.3d 62, 66 (1st Cir. 2009).
76 See Vrljicak v. Holder, 700 F.3d 1060, 1061 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that withholding of
removal does not give all the benefits of asylum).
77 See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.7 (allowing aliens who are granted withholding of removal to apply
for employment authorization).
71 See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.8.
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Congress has specified in the INA that certain convictions are per se
particularly serious crimes. The INA provides that any aggravated felony
conviction is a particularly serious crime that bars asylum, and one or more
aggravated felony convictions with an aggregate sentence of at least five years

is a particularly serious crime barring withholding of removal. 79 Congress set a
higher standard for a crime to be per se "particularly serious" in the context of
withholding of removal in order to avoid potential violations of the international
obligation of nonrefoulement.80 Because courts routinely use the categorical
approach in determining whether a conviction is an aggravated felony, this
approach is applied in deciding whether a conviction is per se particularly
serious under the INA.
However, the BIA and many courts of appeals have held that particularly
serious crimes are not limited to aggravated felonies, and for those convictions,
the BIA has created its own test that does not apply the categorical approach,
despite the use of the word "convicted" in the statute. 81 This makes the
particularly serious crime bar the only bar to relief based on a conviction that
does not involve the categorical approach.
The Supreme Court has explained that the categorical approach applies where
"Congress intended that [a certain statutory] provision be triggered by crimes
having certain specified elements. ' 82 As the Ninth Circuit has explained, "[i]n

the immigration context, this approach therefore generally applies in
determining whether an alien is removable in the first instance or whether he is
statutorily barred from various forms of relief. '83 The court contrasted
"questions of statutory removability and eligibility for relief' with
discretionary

79 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B) (2012) ("[A]n alien who has been convicted of an aggravated
felony (or felonies) for which the alien has been sentenced to an aggregate term of
imprisonment of at least 5 years shall be considered to have committed a particularly serious
crime."); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i) ("[A]n alien who has been convicted of an aggravated
felony shall be considered to have been convicted of a particularly serious crime.").
80 In 1990, Congress made every aggravated felony a particularly serious crime that barred
a noncitizen from receiving withholding of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B) (1994)
(amended 1996). On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted Section 413(f) of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 ("AEDPA"),
which amended former 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) to give the Attorney General discretionary
authority to override the categorical bar that designated any aggravated felony a particularly
serious crime, if necessary, to comply with the nonrefoulement obligation under the Protocol.
Several months later, on September 30, 1996, Congress enacted Section 305(a) of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C,
110 Stat. 3009-546 ("IRIRA"), which again amended 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) and recodified it as
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii), effective as of April 1, 1997.
81 In re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336, 344-45 (B.I.A. 2007).
82 Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 588 (1990) (discussing the categorical approach
in the context of the Armed Career Criminal Act).
83 Torres-Valdivias v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 2015).
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determinations, such as whether to grant an application for adjustment of status,
which is the process of becoming a lawful permanent resident.84
Although the failure to apply the categorical approach to the particularly
serious crime bar is a striking anomaly, it has received little attention from the
BIA or federal courts. In a 2007 case predating Carachuri-Rosendo,
Kawashima, Moncrieffe, Descamps, and Mellouli, the BIA stated in In re N-A-

M-, "[no] decision of which we are aware, has ever suggested that the categorical
approach, used primarily in determining removability, is applicable to the
inherently discretionary determination of whether a conviction is for a
particularly serious crime. ' 85 This statement was dicta because the BIA did not
make a legal finding that the categorical approach does not apply. In fact, the
BIA pointed out that the respondent in 86that case had not even argued that the
categorical approach should be applied.
Nevertheless, two courts of appeals have relied on the BIA's dicta in finding
that the categorical approach does not apply to the particularly serious crime
determination. The Ninth Circuit cited the BIA's decision without any
discussion. 87 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed, relying on the
BIA's rationale that the particularly serious crime determination is
discretionary. 88 The court found that "there are no textual or contextual
indicators in the INA as to 'how the Board should determine whether an alien
has committed a particularly serious crime,"' except for the statutory provision
pertaining to aggravated felony convictions. 89 The Third Circuit did not explain
why the word "convicted" in the statute, which Carachuri-Rosendo had
described as a "statutory hook," does not serve as a textual indicator that triggers
the categorical approach. 90 Because the Third Circuit's decision predated
Kawashima, Moncrieffe, Descamps, and Mellouli, the court did not have the

benefit of those decisions hammering home the significance of the word
"convicted." As of the date of this writing, no other circuits have addressed this
issue. 9'

84

Id.

85 N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 344 (emphasis added).
86 Id. at 344-45.
87 Anaya-Ortiz v. Holder, 594 F.3d 673, 680 (9th Cir. 2010).

Denis v. Att'y Gen. of the United States, 633 F.3d 201, 214-15 (3d Cir. 2011).
89 -Id. at 214 (quoting Chong v. INS, 264 F.3d 378, 387 (3d Cir. 2001)) (internal quotations
omitted).
90 See id.
91Inan unpublished decision where the petitioner argued that the immigration judge and
BIA erred by considering evidence outside the record of conviction, the Sixth Circuit
explained that the BIA's test in N-A-M- permitted this. Hernandez-Vasquez v. Holder, 430 F.
App'x 448,452 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing N-A-M-, 24 1. & N. Dec. at 344). The court also quoted
the language in N-A-M-, noting that the BIA was not aware of any cases suggesting that the
categorical approach is applicable to the particularly serious crime determination, although it
does not rely on that language. See id
88
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There are several reasons to question the BIA's characterization of the
particularly serious crime bar as "inherently discretionary. '92 In an earlier
decision where the BIA refused to apply the principle of proportionality to the
particularly serious crime determination, it reasoned that this principle would
"transform a statutory exclusionary clause into a discretionary consideration. '93
Clearly, the BIA did not consider the particularly serious crime determination
discretionary at that time. In a subsequent case, the BIA reiterated, "the statutory
exclusionary clause for a 'particularly serious crime' relates only to the nature
of the crime itself and that it does not vary with the nature of the evidence of
persecution. '94 Both of these decisions, which pre-date any convictions being
classified as per se particularly serious by the INA, use the term "statutory
exclusionary clause" to emphasize that the determination is not discretionary.
Furthermore, the text of the INA does not specify that the particularly serious
crime bar is discretionary. The statute provides that a noncitizen is ineligible for
withholding of removal if "the Attorney General decides that.., the alien,
having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime is a
danger to the community of the United States. ' 95 For the parallel provision
regarding asylum, the statute uses the word "determines" in lieu of "decides. '96
Several courts of appeals have held that the words "decides" and "determines"
in these statutory provisions do not specify that the decisions are discretionary. 97
Otherwise, the courts would not have jurisdiction over the particularly serious
crime determination, because the INA strips the federal appellate courts of

92 But see N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 344.
93 In re Rodriguez-Coto, 19 I. & N. Dec. 208, 209 (B.I.A. 1985).
94In re Garcia-Garrocho, 19 I. & N. Dec. 423, 424-25 (B.I.A. 1986).
918 U.S.C. § 123 l(b)(3)(B) (2012) (emphasis added).
96 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A) ("Paragraph (I) shall not apply to an alien if the Attorney

General determines that ....(emphasis added)).
97 See, e.g., Arbid v. Holder, 700 F.3d 379, 384 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam); Delgado v.
Holder, 648 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2011) (interpreting the Supreme Court's decision in
Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (2010), to mean that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) only bars
review of a discretionary decision when the statute explicitly refers to the decision of the
Attorney General); Berhane v. Holder, 606 F.3d 819, 821-22 (6th Cir. 2010) ("[E]mpowering
the Attorney General to 'determine[]' (or for that matter 'decide[]') something no more
'speciflies]' 'discretion' than empowering the Attorney General to exercise any number of
responsibilities under the Act, be they interpretations of the Act, adjudications under the Act,
the adoption of rules under the Act or anything else that might count as an administrative
'determination' under the Act." (alterations in original)); Nethagani v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d
150, 154-55 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that the INA does not expressly place the particularly
serious crime determination within the discretion of the Attorney General, so the court retains
jurisdiction to review that determination); Alaka v. Att'y Gen. of the United States, 456 F.3d
88, 96-100 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that "the terms 'decide[]' or 'determin[e]' that precede
the bars to withholding of removal "are not, standing alone, sufficient to 'specify'
discretion").
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jurisdiction over decisions "specified" by statute to be in the Attorney General's
98
discretion.
In holding that this jurisdictional bar did not apply, the Third Circuit reasoned
in Alaka v. Attorney General of the United States that the statute contains no
99
explicit reference to "discretion" and does not use the word "may."
Furthermore, the court stressed that withholding of removal is mandatory when
someone's life or freedom would be threatened, and "[a]ny evaluation of the
'discretionary' nature of the 'particularly serious crime' determination should be
conducted in light of the mandatory character of withholding." 100 The court also
contrasted the particularly serious crime bars with dozens of other INA
provisions that explicitly refer to discretion; it concluded that "[i]f Congress had
wanted to specify the discretion to make the 'particularly serious' determination,
it would have employed the same explicit language used in other provisions of
for the Second and Sixth Circuits
the same statute."'' 1 The Courts of10 Appeals
2
have reached the same conclusion.
In a 2012 decision, the Ninth Circuit agreed that the INA does not "specify"
that the particularly serious crime decision is discretionary, reversing its earlier
position and resolving a circuit split in light of a Supreme Court decision that
clarified the meaning of the INA's jurisdictional bar on discretionary
decisions. 103 However, even though the Ninth Circuit now agrees that the
particularly serious crime determination is reviewable, it has decided that the
proper standard of review is "abuse of discretion.' 1 4 But appellate courts have
not consistently reviewed this determination under the abuse of discretion
standard. There are inconsistencies among and within circuits as to the proper
standard of review for the particularly serious crime determination. Some courts
apply abuse of discretion, while others apply de novo, a combination of de novo
and Chevron deference, or substantial evidence. The different standards of
review reflect confusion over whether the particularly serious crime
determination is a legal conclusion, a mixed question of law and fact, a factual
finding, or an entirely discretionary decision.
Although the Ninth Circuit adopted the abuse of discretion standard in Arbid
v. Holder, in prior decisions it has applied de novo review, or de novo with

98

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (stating that no court has the jurisdiction to review any

"decision" of the Attorney General in removal proceedings).
99 Alaka, 456 F.3d at 97-100 ("By way of contrast, Congress knows how to 'specify'
discretion and has done so repeatedly in other provisions of the INA.").
'0o Id. at 100.
101 Id. at 98.
102Berhane, 606 F.3d at 821-22; Nethagani, 532 F.3d at 154-55 (finding that because of a
strong presumption in favor ofjudicial review, the Attorney General only has discretion when
the statute is explicit).
103See Arbid v. Holder, 700 F.3d 379, 383-85 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam); Delgado v.
Holder, 648 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2011).
104 Arbid, 700 F.3d at 385.
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deference to the BIA's interpretation under Chevron, to the particularly serious
crime determination. 105 The Third Circuit has held that "whether [an alien] was
convicted of a 'particularly serious crime' is a question of law reviewed de novo,
albeit with deference to the agency where appropriate."'01 6 The Sixth Circuit has
explained that the particularly serious crime determination involves "the
application of law to fact" and therefore receives de novo review, although under
Chevron the court must "defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of a
statute it administers unless 'the intent of Congress is clear.""' 107 In older
published decisions, the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have
treated the particularly serious crime determination as a factual conclusion and
reviewed it for substantial evidence. 10 8 Yet in more recent unpublished
105See id.(applying abuse of discretion standard). But see Perez-Palafox v.Holder, 744
F.3d 1138, 1145 (9th Cir. 2014) ("We have consistently held that application of the Frentescu
factors to the underlying facts is a legal conclusion and not a fact-finding endeavor." (citing
Afridi v. Gonzalez, 442 F.3d 1212, 1219 (9th Cir. 2006)); Luan v. INS, No. 96-70323, 1997
WL 599665, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 23, 1997) ("We review de novo whether an offense is a
particularly serious crime ....); Mustafa v. INS, No. 93-70038, 1994 WL 65944, at *1 (9th
Cir. Mar. 1, 1994) ("We review de novo the question of whether Mustafa's offenses constitute
'particularly serious crimes' but with deference to the INS' interpretation of that term in its
regulations."); Tran v. INS, No. 92-70399, 1993 WL 420820, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 1993)
("We review de novo the question of whether Tran's offenses constitute 'particularly serious
crimes' but with deference to the BIA's interpretation of the statute."); Beltran-Zavala v. INS,
912 F.2d 1027, 1029 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Whether an offense is a particularly serious crime under
Section 243(h)(2)(B) of the INA is reviewed de novo, but with deference to the INS'
interpretation of that term in its regulations."). Despite the Immigration Act of 1990, which
made all aggravated felonies per se particularly serious crimes during this period, the BIA
continued to adjudicate particularly serious crimes on a case-by-case basis between 1990 and
1996. See Delgado, 648 F.3d at 1104; In re B-, 20 1. & N. Dec. 427, 430-31 (B.I.A. 1991).
106Infante v. Att'y Gen. of the United States, 574 F. App'x 142, 145 (3d Cir. 2014); see
also Denis v. Att'y Gen. of the United States, 633 F.3d 201, 205-06 (3d Cir. 2011) ("Denis
contends that his crime of conviction. . . should not constitute a particularly serious
crime ....[This] assertion implicates 'constitutional claims or questions of law,' and we
review the BIA's legal determinations de novo, subject to Chevron principles of deference."
(citation omitted)); Lavira v. Att'y Gen. of the United States, 478 F.3d 158, 164 (3d Cir. 2007)
(holding that whether an alien has been convicted of a particularly serious crime is a question
of law reviewed de novo), overruledon other grounds by Pierre v. Att'y Gen. of the United
States, 528 F.3d 180, 189 (3d Cir. 2008) (en banc).
107 Hamama v. INS, 78 F.3d 233, 239 (6th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted).
108 See Mejia v. INS, No. 96-60655, 1997 WL 450111, at *3 (5th Cir. July 9, 1997) ("Mejia
pleaded guilty to striking a police officer after Mejia 'knew and had been informed that
[Officer Pagan] was a peace officer,' which was a crime against a person that constitutes a
flagrant disregard for authority. There was substantial evidence to support the ruling of the
BIA."); Karapetyan v. INS, No. 95-1103, 1995 WL 522573, at *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 6, 1995)
("Substantial evidence supports the finding that this constituted a conviction of a 'particularly
serious crime' precluding the withholding of deportation and mandating the denial of
asylum."); Sam v. INS, No. 93-5019, 1994 WL 57627, at *1 (5th Cir. Feb. 17, 1994) (per
curiam) ("[O]ur review of the BIA's factual conclusion that Sam was convicted of a
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decisions, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have applied abuse of discretion. 10 9 The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held that abuse of discretion is the
proper standard of review, unless the claim is that the BIA failed to apply the
"right rule of law when making the classification."1' 10 This approach resembles
the Ninth Circuit's current approach, as the Ninth Circuit has explained that it
will not "re-weigh" a discretionary determination but it will review de novo a
legal issue, such as whether the BIA applied the correct legal standard.' The
Courts of Appeals for the Second, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have applied abuse
of discretion in unpublished decisions. 11 2 The inconsistent application of the
standards of review indicates that most courts have not explicitly grappled with
the issue of whether or not the particularly serious crime bar is discretionary,
much less examined the related question of whether the categorical approach
should apply.
In addition, classifying the particularly serious crime determination as
discretionary conflicts with how courts have treated other bars to withholding of
removal in the same section of the statute. For example, the clause immediately
following the particularly serious crime bar applies if "there are serious reasons
to believe that the alien committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the
United States before the alien arrived in the United States."' 13 This bar does not
require a conviction, but it is reviewed under a more probing standard than abuse
of discretion. Courts have applied the substantial evidence standard in
examining the BIA's factual findings regarding the criminal nature of the act

particularly serious crime is guided by the familiar 'substantial evidence' standard.").
109 See, e.g., Lozano-Bolanos v. Holder, 588 F. App'x 272, 272 (4th Cir. 2014) (per
curiam) (concluding that "the Board did not abuse its discretion in finding that LozanoBolanos was convicted of a particularly serious crime"); Solorzano-Moreno v. Mukasey, 296
F. App'x 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding that the petitioner's arguments about the
particularly serious crime determination "amount to an argument that the immigration judge
'abused [her] discretion in weighing the multiple desiderata made relevant by the [BIA's]
definition of a 'particularly serious crime' (quoting Petrov v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 800, 802
(7th Cir. 2006))).
110 Petrov, 464 F.3d at 802 (citing Tunis v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 547, 549 (7th Cir. 2006)).
"I Konou v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2014) ("Although we cannot reweigh
evidence to determine if the crime was indeed particularly serious, [we] can determine
whether the BIA applied the correct legal standard."); Pechenkov v. Holder, 705 F.3d 444,
448-49 (9th Cir. 2012) ("Petitioner has not raised a constitutional or legal question in relation
to the 'particularly serious crime' determination; instead, he asks for a re-weighing of the
factors involved in that discretionary determination.").
112 Hassan v. Holder, 446 F. App'x 822, 823 (8th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) ("Upon review,
we conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that Hassan was ineligible
for withholding of removal because he had been convicted of a particularly serious crime and
was a danger to the community."); Akrami v. Chertoff, 186 F. App'x 47, 50 (2d Cir. 2006)
("[T]he [immigration judge] did not abuse her discretion in finding that Akrami was also
barred from withholding, having been convicted of a particularly serious crime.").
13 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(b)(3)(B)(iii) (2012).
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and the political motive for the actions. 14 Some courts have also applied the
Chevron doctrine to review the BIA test for a "serious nonpolitical crime" by
examining whether the criminal nature of the offense is "outweighed" by its
political nature. 115 Similarly, courts have applied the substantial evidence
standard of review to another bar that applies if the noncitizen has engaged in
16
the persecution of others.'
Because the particularly serious crime bar, like the serious nonpolitical crime
bar and the persecution of others bar, usually involves factual findings about the
circumstances surrounding a crime, those findings should be reviewed under the
substantial evidence standard, rather than for abuse of discretion. Furthermore,
the BIA's current test combines this factual inquiry with an examination of the
elements of the offense, giving the test a legal dimension as well. Indeed, the
BIA has stressed that "[t]he language of the statute provides the 'essentialkey'
to determining whether a crime is particularly serious," and it has held that some
offenses can be deemed particularly serious based on their elements alone.1 17
Errors involving the interpretation of the elements of an offense are normally
considered legal questions and reviewed de novo. 118 The BIA's emphasis on the
114See, e.g., Zheng v. Holder, 698 F.3d 710, 713-14 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding substantial
evidence that Zheng's attack against a family planning official in China, resulting in serious
physical injury, was a serious nonpolitical crime, based on the immigration judge's findings
that the assault was not a political response to China's family planning policy, but was
motivated by the official's refusal to return Zheng's property); Go v. Holder, 640 F.3d 1047,
1052-53 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying the substantial evidence standard to uphold the lower
court's ruling that Go's drug trafficking activities prior to entering United States constituted
a serious nonpolitical crime); Berhane v. Holder, 606 F.3d 819, 823 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying
the substantial evidence standard in reviewing the BIA's determination that throwing rocks at
the police during demonstrations in Ethiopia constituted a "serious nonpolitical crime");
Urbina-Mejia v. Holder, 597 F.3d 360, 369-70 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying the substantial
evidence standard to find that Urbina-Mejia's gang activity in his native country of Honduras,
which included attacking a man with a baseball bat and extorting people for money, was a
serious nonpolitical crime); Wang v. Holder, 583 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 2009) (applying the
substantial evidence standard in holding that participation in a scheme to deceive prisoners
and their families and to sell organs on the black market was a serious nonpolitical crime).
1" Berhane, 606 F.3d at 823-35 (applying the Chevron doctrine and holding that the BIA
had not exercised "reasoned discretion" in its treatment of rock throwing as a serious
nonpolitical crime and in disregarding arguments about self-defense).
116See 8 U.S.C. § 123 l(b)(3)(B)(i). For cases applying substantial evidence review to the
persecution of others bar, see Castafieda-Castillo v. Holder, 723 F.3d 48, 53-54 (1st Cir.
2013); Ntamack v. Holder, 372 F. App'x 407, 411 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam); Parlak v.
Holder, 578 F.3d 457,470 (6th Cir. 2009); Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 915, 929
(9th Cir. 2006); Zheng v. BIA, 119 F. App'x 321, 323 (2d Cir. 2005).
"l In re G-G-S-, 26 1. & N. Dec. 339, 344 (B.I.A. 2014) (emphasis added).
118 See, e.g., United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 249 n.8 (1985) ("Whether the elements
that constitute 'reasonable cause' are present in a given situation is a question of fact, but
what elements must be present to constitute 'reasonable cause' is a question of law."); United
States v. Pitrone, 115 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997) (explaining that when an error "involves the
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elements of the offense supports the position that the particularly serious crime
determination is not purely discretionary. If the federal courts ultimately agree
that the particularly serious crime determination is not discretionary, then the
categorical approach should certainly be applied. However, even if they
conclude that it is discretionary, the BIA could decide on its own to apply the
categorical approach to the particularly serious crime determination.
The following Section discusses in detail the BIA's current test for whether a
conviction constitutes a particularly serious crime. This discussion shows how
it conflates certain aspects of the categorical approach with the type of factual
inquiry that is strictly prohibited under that approach. The Article argues that the
result is unworkable because it creates an overly expansive exception to the
international nonrefoulement obligation and leads to arbitrary and unpredictable
decisions about which convictions will become bars to asylum and withholding
of removal.
C. The BIA 's Quasi-CategoricalApproach
In 1982, eight years before the INA included any statutory classifications of
certain offenses as particularly serious crimes, the BIA issued its decision in the
Matter of Frentescu,11 9 which addressed the particularly serious crime
determination. The BIA explained, "[w]hile there are crimes which, on their
face, are 'particularly serious crimes' or clearly are not 'particularly serious
crimes,' the record in most proceedings will have to be analyzed on a case-bycase basis. ' '120 Thus, the BIA found that some convictions could be deemed per
se particularly serious by immigration judges, while others would require an
individualized inquiry. 121 The BIA then provided four factors to consider in that
analysis, which include "the nature of the conviction, the circumstances and
underlying facts of the conviction, the type of sentence imposed, and, most
importantly, whether the type and circumstances of the crime indicate that the
122
alien will be a danger to the community.
Several years later, the BIA held in the Matter of Carballe123 that a separate
assessment of dangerousness is not required for the particularly serious crime
bar to apply. 124 The BIA interpreted the statutory provision as establishing a
cause-and-effect relationship between the conviction and the danger. 125 In other
words, the conviction for a particularly serious crime is what demonstrates that
the noncitizen poses a danger to the community. Carballe explained that the
interpretation of the elements of a statutory offense, it poses a question of law" that receives
de novo review).

1 18 I. & N. Dec. 244 (B.I.A. 1982).
Id.at 247.
121 Id.
120

122

Id.

123

19 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1986).

124Id. at 360.
125

Id. at 359-60.

1446

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:1427

"essential key" to this inquiry is the nature of the crime, meaning the elements
of the offense. 126 In holding that robbery and attempted robbery are particularly
serious crimes based on their elements alone, this decision also reinforced the
principle first mentioned in Frentescu, that some crimes are particularly serious
on their face.
In subsequent cases, the BIA classified additional offenses as per se
particularly serious crimes, such as drug trafficking and burglary involving a
dangerous weapon or resulting in physical injury. 127 In In re Q-T-M-T-, 128 the
BIA confirmed that "a consistent practice of this Board has been to classify
certain crimes as per se 'particularly serious crimes' on their face without
proceeding to an individualized examination of the Frentescu factors. ' 129 Yet
the BIA did not consistently apply its own rules, leading Attorney General John
Ashcroft to issue a decision in 2002 holding that any drug trafficking crime is
presumptively a particularly serious crime. 130 The opinion reversed three
separate BIA decisions that had held that drug trafficking convictions were not
particularly serious crimes.13' In so doing, the Attorney General's opinion was
highly critical of the BIA's case-by-case approach, noting that the BIA's
application of "an individualized, and often haphazard, assessment as to the
'seriousness' of an alien defendant's crime ... has led to results that are both
132
inconsistent and, as plainly evident here, illogical."
The Attorney General attempted to address this problem by stressing the
importance of the "harmful character of a crime" and minimizing the
significance of factors such as the length of the sentence. 133 Although the
Attorney General noted that he "might be well within [his] discretion to conclude
that all drug trafficking offenses are per se 'particularly serious crimes' under
the INA," he found it unnecessary "to exclude entirely the possibility of very
rare case where an alien may be able to demonstrate extraordinary and
126 Id. at 360; see also In re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336, 344 (B.I.A. 2007) (explaining

that the "nature of the crime" is "measured by its elements").
127 In re U-M-, 20 1. & N. Dec. 327, 330-31 (B.I.A. 1991) ("We find that the crime of
trafficking in drugs is inherently a particularly serious crime ...no further inquiry is required
into the nature and circumstances of the respondent's convictions for sale or transportation of
marihuana and sale of LSD."); In re Gonzalez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 682, 683-84 (B.I.A. 1988)
(indicating that drug trafficking is a particularly serious crime); In re Garcia-Garrocho, 19 I.
&N. Dec. 423, 426 (B.I.A. 1986) (holding that a conviction for first-degree burglary under a
New York statute was "per se 'particularly serious' because it required "aggravating
circumstances" that "involve[d] physical injury or potentially life-threatening acts").
128 211. & N. Dec. 639 (B.I.A. 1996).
129 Id. at 650-51 (holding that categorizing certain crimes as per se particularly serious,
whether by statute or case law, did not violate the United States' international obligations
under the Refugee Convention or the Protocol).
130 In re Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 274 (Att'y Gen. 2002).
131 Id.
132 Id. at 273.
133 Id.at 273-74.
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compelling circumstances that justify treating a particular drug trafficking crime
as falling short of that standard."'1 34 The decision set forth six specific criteria
that provided a minimum standard for overcoming the presumption that a drug
135
trafficking crime is particularly serious.
In 2007, the BIA issued its decision in N-A-M-, which provided a more
detailed explanation of its approach for determining whether or not a conviction
is a particularly serious crime. 136 This case addressed for the first time the
interplay between the elements of an offense and the fact-specific analysis. The
BIA explained:
If the elements of the offense do not potentially bring the crime into a
category of particularly serious crimes, the individual facts and
circumstances of the offense are of no consequence, and the alien would
not be barred from a grant of withholding of removal. On the other hand,
once the elements of the offense are examined and found to potentially
bring the offense within the ambit of a particularly serious crime, all
reliable information may be considered in making a particularly serious
crime determination, including the conviction records and sentencing
information, as well as other information outside the confines of a record
137
of conviction.
Here, the BIA instructed immigration judges to first look at the elements to
determine if the crime is clearly outside the reach of the particularly serious
crime bar. If the crime could potentially be particularly serious based on the
elements, then the judge is allowed to look at individualized facts but is not
required to do so. This approach presents two major challenges. First, it remains
unclear what elements bring an offense "within the ambit" of a particularly
serious crime. This makes it extremely difficult to apply the initial step of the
analysis and leads to arbitrary and inconsistent decisions. Second, adjudicators
"may"-but are not required to--consider all reliable information, which also
results in ad hoc decisions about whether to employ an element-based or factbased approach. Each of these issues is discussed below.

Id. at 276.
Id. at 276-77. These six criteria are:
"(1) a very small quantity of controlled substance; (2) a very modest amount of money
paid for the drugs in the offending transaction; (3) merely peripheral involvement by the
134
135

alien in the criminal activity, transaction, or conspiracy; (4) the absence of any violence
or threat of violence, implicit or otherwise, associated with the offense; (5) the absence
of any organized crime or terrorist organization involvement, direct or indirect, in
relation to the offending activity; and (6) the absence of any adverse or harmful effect of
the activity or transaction on juveniles."

Id.
131 In re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336, 342 (B.I.A. 2007).
137 Id.
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1. The Unidentified Elements of a Particularly Serious Crime
The first challenge with the BIA's test in N-A-M- is that the BIA has never

identified the elements of a particularly serious crime. The BIA has indicated
that crimes against persons, especially crimes involving the use of force,
violence, or threats, are "more likely" to be particularly serious crimes. 138 This

rule of thumb also appears to include crimes against animals, because the BIA
139
has found that harming a poodle constitutes a particularly serious crime.

However, the BIA has never limited particularly serious crimes to such offenses.
In fact, the BIA has explicitly stated that an offense "does not have to be violent
to be a particularly serious crime," 140 and it has cautioned, "there may be

instances where crimes (or a crime) against property will be considered
[particularly serious].

' 141

Thus, the BIA has not made the use of force or harm

to a living being a necessary element of a particularly serious crime.
Similarly, while the BIA has indicated that evil intent is relevant to the
particularly serious crime determination, it has never held that this is a required
element. 142 Cases indicating the relevance of intent include In re L-S-, 143 where
the BIA reasoned that because a conviction for alien smuggling could be
motivated by love, charity, kindness, or religious principles, adjudicators should
"exercise great caution in designating such an offense as a particularly serious
crime for purposes of [withholding of removal].' 144 Furthermore, in an
unpublished decision, the BIA decided that telephoning a bomb threat was a
particularly serious crime because the statute included a "willful" and
"malicious" intent requirement. 145 Similarly, Madrid v. Holder146 stressed that
the elements of the crime required malicious and intentional harm. 147 But, the
BIA has also found crimes requiring only recklessness or negligence to be
particularly serious. For example, the BIA has found that convictions for

138 See In re S-V-, 22 1. & N. Dec. 1306, 1309 (B.I.A. 2000) (finding a conviction for
armed robbery to be a "particularly serious crime"); In re Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244, 247
(B.I.A. 1982) (finding that "[c]rimes against persons are more likely to be categorized as

'particularly serious crimes"').
139 See Madrid v. Holder, 541 F. App'x 789, 791 (9th Cir. 2013) (involving a violation of

a California law that prohibits malicious and intentional harming of animals).
140 In re R-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 657, 662 (B.I.A. 2012).
141 Frentescu, 18 . & N. Dec. at 247.
142 In re G-G-S-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 339, 346-47 (B.I.A. 2014).
143 22 I. & N. Dec. 645 (B.I.A. 1999).
144 Id. at 655 (citing In re Tiwari, 19 1. & N. Dec. 875 (B.I.A.1989)).
145 See Abpikar v. Holder, 544 F. App'x 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Blandino-Medina
v. Holder, 712 F.3d 1338, 1346-47 (9th Cir. 2013) (vacating the BIA's decision that a
conviction for telephoning a bomb threat was per se particularly serious based on a precedent
holding that the BIA cannot classify crimes as per se particularly serious for purposes of
withholding of removal).
146541 F.-App'x 789 (9th Cir. 2013).
141Id.at 791-92.
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reckless endangerment (shooting a gun into the air illegally), reckless homicide,
and driving under the influence are particularly serious crimes. 148 In the Matter
of G-G-S-, 149 the BIA explained, "since the focus in a particularly serious crime
analysis is whether the offense justifies a determination that the respondent 'is a
danger to the community,' an inquiry regarding evil intent or fraud is not
necessarily dispositive."' 50
In practice, such a wide range of offenses have been classified as particularly
serious crimes that it is difficult to identify which elements indicate that the
crime in question does or does not come "within the ambit" of this classification.
In terms of crimes against property, even financial crimes have been deemed
151
particularly serious. In Kaplun v. Attorney General of the United States, the
petitioner argued that the BIA had erred in finding that his conviction for
securities fraud, an aggravated felony with a sentence of less than five years,
was a particularly serious crime.' 52 He pointed out that no BIA precedents had
held that a nonviolent, white-collar offense could constitute a particularly
serious crime. 153 The Third Circuit rejected this argument, reasoning that the
INA makes all aggravated felonies with a sentence of at least five years
particularly serious crimes, and aggravated felonies include a number of
nonviolent financial crimes. 1 54 The court noted, "nothing in our precedent
suggests that a financial crime cannot, as a matter of law, be a particularly
serious crime."' 155
Other courts have also upheld BIA determinations that financial crimes
constitute particularly serious crimes. The Ninth Circuit, for example, upheld a
BIA decision that a conviction for mail fraud, resulting in a $650,000 restitution
56
order and a sixteen-month sentence, was a particularly serious crime.
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit upheld a BIA determination that a conviction for
money laundering, resulting in a sentence of thirty-seven months, constituted a
148 Saqr v. Holder, 580 F.3d 414, 418 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding that the BIA affirmed the

immigration judge's determination that reckless homicide is a particularly serious crime);
Delgado v. Holder, 563 F.3d 863, 865 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that the BIA found that three

prior offenses of driving under the influence constituted "particularly serious crimes");
Nethagani v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 150, 152, 155 (2d Cir. 2008) (upholding the BIA's

determination that first-degree reckless endangerment is a particularly serious crime).
149 26 I. & N. Dec. 339 (B.I.A. 2014).
150 Id. at 347 (holding that the respondent's conviction for assault with a deadly weapon,
a general intent crime under California law, was a particularly serious crime and that the role
of respondent's mental illness was irrelevant to the analysis because it had not been raised in
criminal court).
151602 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2010).
152 Id. at 267-68.
153 Id.
154

Id.

155 Id. at 268.

Arbid v. Holder, 700 F.3d 379, 385 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding the BIA did not abuse its
discretion in finding a scheme to defraud victims to be a particularly serious crime).
156
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particularly serious crime.157 In that case, the BIA reasoned that money
laundering presented a danger to the community because it was related to drug
trafficking. 158 In another case involving identity theft and access device fraud,
the Fifth Circuit affirmed that the crimes were particularly serious because the
petitioner was "involved in a large scale scheme that resulted in losses to 23
different individuals and banking organizations, the theft of 419 identities, and
a loss of $54,329.44." 59
There are also cases indicating that the BIA has deemed "crime[s] against the
orderly pursuit ofjustice" to be particularly serious.160 For instance, in one case,
the BIA found that resisting arrest was a particularly serious crime. There, the
respondent had "[run] through traffic to evade arrest, assumed a 'fighting stance'
with the police officer, and shoved [the officer] when he tried to place [the
respondent] under arrest."' 16 1 The Ninth Circuit vacated the BIA's decision,
stating "we cannot discern... the operative rationale of its particularly serious
crime determination."'1 62 In another case, the BIA found that a conviction for
tampering with evidence constituted a particularly serious crime. In that case,
the BIA stressed that the underlying facts, which involved hacking up a corpse,
1 63
demonstrated "gruesome brutality."'
Even some victimless crimes have been classified as particularly serious. One
appellate case characterized a BIA finding that prostitution is a particularly
serious crime as being based not any particular evidence, but rather on "the
totality of the impact prostitution inflicts upon a community."' 64 The Court of
Hakim v. Holder, 628 F.3d 151, 154-55 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding the BIA applied the
correct legal standard in determining that a money laundering scheme was a particularly
serious crime).
158 Id. at 152.
159 Yang v. Holder, 570 F. App'x 381, 385 (5th Cir. 2014) (rejecting the petitioner's
argument that his counsel had been ineffective in conceding to the particularly serious crime
determination).
160 See Alphonsus v. Holder, 705 F.3d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir. 2013).
161 Id.at 1047.
162 Id.at 1044.
163 Denis v. Att'y Gen. of the United States, 633 F.3d 201, 216 (3d Cir. 2011). The
petitioner was convicted under Section 215.40 of the New York Penal Laws, which provides:
A person is guilty of tampering with physical evidence when:
1. With intent that it be used or introduced in an official proceeding or a prospective
official proceeding, he (a) knowingly makes, devises or prepares false physical
evidence, or (b) produces or offers such evidence at such a proceeding knowing it to
be false; or
2. Believing that certain physical evidence is about to be produced or used in an
official proceeding or a prospective official proceeding, and intending to prevent such
production or use, he suppresses it by any act of concealment, alteration or destruction,
or by employing force, intimidation or deception against any person.
Tampering with physical evidence is a class E felony.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.40 (McKinney 2010).
164
Yuan v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 487 F. App'x 511, 514 (1lth Cir. 2012) (quoting the BIA's
157
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Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated this decision because "[t]he BIA
reached this conclusion without examining the elements of the offense, the
circumstances of the conviction, or the type of sentence imposed," as required
by Frentescu.165 The court remanded to the BIA without reaching the issue of
whether a single conviction for prostitution (or, for that matter, multiple
166
convictions) constitutes a particularly serious crime. However, the Eleventh
Circuit did note that "the BIA's reasoning reflect[ed] no analytical framework
by which it can rationally distinguish crimes that are 'particularly serious' from
those that are not," because "every petty crime, such as speeding, jaywalking,

1 67
Unless the BIA identifies
and loitering, has an impact on the community."'

with greater specificity what elements do or do not bring an offense within the
ambit of a particularly serious crime, this critique remains relevant today.
These decisions demonstrate that a wide range of crimes, violent and
nonviolent, against people and against property, with and without evil intent, can
be considered "particularly serious." Given the expansive interpretation of this
term, it remains unclear what elements bring an offense "within the ambit" of a
particularly serious crime. Likewise, it remains unclear what elements remove
an offense from the ambit of this classification. Consequently, immigration
judges tend to almost always look at the underlying facts and circumstances
before making a determination. For example, in Arbid, where the Ninth Circuit
examined the immigration judge's decision that a conviction for mail fraud was
a particularly serious crime, the court noted that "[t]he [immigration judge]
168
began his analysis with a review of the Frentescufactors."' This suggests that
the immigration judge did not first decide whether the elements brought the
offense within the ambit of a particularly serious crime as required by N-A-M-.
The Third Circuit case involving tampering with evidence similarly raises
questions about why the elements brought the offense within the ambit of a
particularly serious crime. In that case, the facts regarding dismembering a
corpse were terrible, but it is unclear why the elements alone would signal the
169
possibility of a particularly serious crime. There, the petitioner made the
argument that the elements did not bring the offense within the ambit of a
particularly serious crime because the conduct did not involve the use of force
or violence against another person; the court rejected this argument, however,
stating simply that other offenses can also be viewed as particularly serious
crimes. 170 This reasoning suggests that there are no clear boundaries for "safe
harbor" pleas that fall outside the ambit of a particularly serious crime. The BIA
asserts that the elements of a crime are the "essential key" to the analysis, but it
decision).
165 Id.
166 Id.
167

Id.

168

Arbid v. Holder, 700 F.3d 379, 385 (9th Cir. 2012).

169 Denis v. Att'y Gen. of the United States, 633 F.3d 201, 216 (3d Cir. 2011).
170 Id.

1452

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 97:1427

has provided no concrete guidance about what elements do or do not fall within
the ambit of a particularly serious crime.
2. Ad Hoc Decisions About Whether to Use an Element-Based or FactBased Approach
Because N-A-M- simply states that all reliable information may be considered
once the offense is within the ambit of a particularly serious crime, adjudicators
are not required to look beyond the elements of an offense. 171 In fact, in that
very case, the BIA concluded that the respondent's conviction was "a
particularly serious crime based solely on its elements."'1 72 The Colorado statute
under which the respondent had been convicted required a person to use, or
represent that he or she was armed with, a deadly weapon, and to knowingly
place or attempt to place another person in fear of imminent serious bodily
injury. 173 The BIA reasoned that because this statutory provision required a

serious threat to others, the offense was a crime against a person, and because
"crimes against persons are more likely to be categorized as particularly
serious... the respondent was convicted of a particularly serious crime.' 74 The
BIA did not explain the logical leap from being "more likely" to be particularly
serious to being per se particularly serious. As mentioned above, there are
several other cases where the BIA has held that certain convictions are
particularly serious on their face. 175
Several courts of appeals have upheld BIA determinations that a crime is
particularly serious on its face. The Sixth Circuit, for example, affirmed the
BIA's determination that assault with a firearm with intent to murder is
inherently a particularly serious crime. 176 The court also affirmed the BIA's
conclusion that a noncitizen convicted of felonious assault, possession of a
firearm in the commission of a felony, and carrying a pistol in a vehicle, had
been convicted of a particularly serious crime because the elements indicated
that the conduct involved "the substantial risk of violence towards another
person." 177 The Second Circuit found that first-degree manslaughter is per se a
171 See

supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text. Prior decisions also indicate that an
adjudicator need not go beyond the elements of an offense in determining that it constitutes a
particularly serious crime. See, e.g., Hamama v. INS, 78 F.3d 233, 240 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting
that the Board may find some crimes to be per se particularly serious without needing to
examine the individual circumstances of the crime); In re Garcia-Garrocho, 19 I. & N. Dec.

423, 426 (B.I.A. 1986) (looking at the elements of the offense of burglary in the first degree
and fmding that, on its face, such a crime is a particularly serious one).
172 In re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336, 343 (B.I.A.2007).
173 Id. (discussing COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 18-3-206(l)(a)-(b) (2006)).
174

Id.

See, e.g., Garcia-Garrocho,19 I. & N. Dec. at 425-26; In re Carballe, 19 I. & N. Dec.
357, 360-61 (B.I.A. 1986).
176 Gjonaj v. INS, 47 F.3d 824, 826 (6th Cir. 1995).
177 Hamama v. INS, 78 F.3d 233, 240 (6th Cir. 1996).
175
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particularly serious crime, even though the petitioner in that case testified that
178
Furthermore, the Eleventh
she shot her abusive husband in self-defense.
rely solely on the79elements
to
"free
are
judges
immigration
that
stated
Circuit has
determination. 1
crime
serious
particularly
a
making
in
offense"
of the
So far, only the Ninth Circuit has held that it is impermissible for an
adjudicator to classify a crime as per se particularly serious. In Blandino-Medina
80
the Ninth Circuit found that the BIA erred in finding that the felony
v. Holder,1
of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child under the age of fourteen in violation
181
of California Penal Code 288(a) was per se a particularly serious crime. The
court reasoned that the overall structure of the INA compels the conclusion that
Congress created only one category of per se particularly serious crimes for
withholding of removal (aggravated felonies with a sentence of at least five
years), requiring the BIA to conduct a case-by-case analysis for all convictions
outside that category. 182 The court also noted that, while the asylum statute
allows the Attorney General to designate by regulation which offenses are
considered particularly serious crimes, there is no analogue in the withholding
of removal statue. 183 The Third Circuit has also used language that calls into
it is legally permissible to classify offenses as per se
questions whether 184
serious.
particularly
Allowing adjudicators to declare certain crimes per se particularly serious
leaves immigration judges free to make ad hoc decisions about whether to apply
an element-based or fact-based approach. This leads to arbitrary, inconsistent,
and unpredictable outcomes. Furthermore, deciding that a crime is per se
particularly serious is different than applying the categorical approach. In cases
following the BIA's lead that certain crimes are per se particularly serious
crimes, adjudicators do not compare the elements of the statute of conviction to
the generic federal offense. Consequently, a crime such as burglary that is
defined differently in different states and does not always meet the federal
generic definition of burglary could be deemed a particularly serious185crime even
in states where a critical element such as unlawful entry is missing.

118 Ahmetovic v. INS, 62 F.3d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Hamama, 78 F.3d at 240

(holding that "some crimes are facially 'particularly serious"' and that the BIA "has the
prerogative to declare a crime particularly serious without examining each and every
Frentescu factor").
179 Lapaix v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 605 F.3d 1138, 1143 (1 lth Cir. 2010).
180 Blandino-Medina v. Holder, 712 F.3d 1338 (9th Cir. 2013).
ld. at 1343-47 (concluding that Congress has precluded the agency from creating new
I8
categories of per se particularly serious crimes).
182 Id. at 1345.
183 Id. at 1346.
184 See Chong v. INS, 264 F.3d 378, 388 (3d Cir. 2001).
185 See supra Section L.A (discussing the consequences of disconnecting a state statute's
elements of conviction from the generic federal offense in other.contexts).
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One alternative to this ad hoc approach is to apply the categorical approach
to the particularly serious crime bar just as it is applied to other convictions that
are bars to various forms of relief.186 For this to work, of course, the BIA must
identify the elements that are required for a conviction to be a particularly
serious crime, as discussed above, 187 or limit particularly serious crimes to
aggravated felonies (for asylum) or aggravated felonies with a sentence of at
least five years (for withholding of removal).188 Another alternative is to require
a completely individualized analysis. The following Part explores this second
option, which is how UNHCR interprets the particularly serious crime bar.
II.

THE INDIVIDUALIZED APPROACH

Just as the BIA's test for determining whether a conviction should be
classified as a particularly serious crime does not use the categorical approach,
nor does it apply a fully individualized analysis. The BIA departs from an
individualized approach not only by allowing some crimes to be deemed per se
particularly serious, but also by excluding certain factual considerations from
the analysis.189 Because UNHCR interprets the particularly serious crime bar in
the Refugee Convention as requiring an individualized approach, this Part
begins by discussing the historical origin of the bar. After explaining UNHCR's
interpretation and its underlying concerns regarding consistency and fairness,
this Part shows how the BIA's current test departs from UNHCR's approach.
A. HistoricalOrigins
The particularly serious crime bar in U.S. asylum law comes from Article 33
of the Refugee Convention. The first part of Article 33 sets forth the
nonrefoulement principle, stating that "[n]o Contracting State shall expel or
return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion."' 190 Initial drafts of the Refugee Convention did not include any
exceptions to this fundamental principle of nonrefoulement.191 The U.K.
representative on the committee responsible for drafting the Refugee
Convention expressed concerns about "how to deal with cases where a refugee
was disturbing the public order of the UK," referring "not to ordinary crimes,
186

See infra Section III.A (discussing how a categorical approach to determining

particularly serious crimes would be applied in practice).

187 See supra notes 171-79 and accompanying text (discussing an element-based approach
to determining particularly serious crimes).
188 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
189 See infra Section II.C (discussing how the BIA fails to incorporate important factors
and legal principles into its nonrefoulment assessments).
190 Refugee Convention, supranote 2, art. 33(1).
191 Guy S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE ININTERNATIONAL LAW 203-

04 (3d ed. 2007).
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but to such acts as inviting disorder. ' 192 The U.S. representative thought "it
would be highly undesirable to suggest in the text of that Article that there might
be cases, even highly exceptional cases, where a man might be sent to death or
persecution." 193 The French representative agreed with the U.S. position,
considering it "absolutely inhuman" and "contrary to the very purpose of the
Convention" to return a genuine refugee to his country of origin, even in
exceptional circumstances. 194

But, by the time the Conference of the Plenipotentiaries took place, the
international situation had deteriorated, and two proposals were offered for an
exception to the nonrefoulement principle. Sweden proposed an exception "in
cases where the presence of a refugee in the territory of a Contracting State
95
would constitute a danger to national security or public order."' This exception
in subversive
was intended to apply in situations where "refugees engaged
196
activities threatening the security of their country of asylum."'
France and the United Kingdom proposed different language, stating that the
benefit of nonrefoulement "may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom
there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the
country in which he is residing, or who, having been lawfully convicted in that
country of particularly serious crimes of [sic] offences, constitutes a danger to
the community thereof. '197 France and the United Kingdom stressed that their
key concern was protecting national security. 198 They were worried that some
refugees would be "tempted to engage in activities on behalf of a foreign Power
against the country of their asylum" and thought it would be unreasonable not
to allow a state to protect itself.199 The U.K. representative indicated that a state
should be able "to decide whether the danger entailed to refugees by expulsion
200
outweighed the menace to public security if they were permitted to stay.
During the discussion, the word "offences" was dropped from the English
20 1
version of the proposal and the words "by final judgment" were added. A
suggestion to change the phrase to "particularly serious acts" was rejected as
subject to arbitrary interpretations. 20 2 Likewise, a suggestion to add language
192 RESEARCH CTR. FOR INT'L LAW, UNIV. OF CAMBRIDGE, THE REFUGEE CONVENTION,

1951: THE TRAvAUX PREPARATOMES ANALYSED 326 (Paul Weis ed., 1995).
193 Id.

194 Id. at 327.

195 Id. at 328 (emphasis omitted).
196

Id. at 330.

117 Id. at 328.

'9' Id. at 329-30.
199 Id.

at 330.

Id. at 329.
201 Id. at 332, 335.
202 Id. at 333 (emphasis added) ("The French representative suggested that,in [sic] order
to simplify matters, 'convicted because of particularly serious acts' could be substituted. The
Belgian representative could not accept those words, which he thought could be interpreted
200
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extending the exception to those "declared by a court an habitual offender" was
rejected as unduly widening the exception. 20 3 The U.K. representative noted that
a habitual offender could include someone with an accumulation of petty crimes,
2°4
which was outside the scope of the provision.
Ultimately, an amended version of the exception proposed by France and the
United Kingdom was adopted. The final version of the language contained in
Article 33(2) reads:
The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a
refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the
security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a
finaljudgment of a particularlyserious crime, constitutes a danger to the
20 5
community of that country.

In 1968, the United States ratified the Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, which incorporates Articles 2 through 34 of the Refugee
Convention. 20 6 The United States codified these international obligations in the
Refugee Act of 1980, which is now part of the INA. 20 7
Both parts of the exception in Article 33(2) appear, in almost identical
language, in the INA. The first part provides an exception to withholding of
removal if "there are reasonable grounds to believe that the alien is a danger to
the security of the United States. ''20 8 The second part applies if "the alien, having
been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime is a danger to
the community of the United States. ' 20 9 Although the INA preserves the
language of Article 33(2), by breaking up the exception into two different
statutory provisions, it loses sight of the relationship between particularly
serious crimes and concerns about threats to national security, thereby opening
the door to a broader interpretation of a "particularly serious crime" than the
drafters of the Refugee Convention intended.
The commentary on the Travaux Preparatoires provided by Paul Weis
confirms that Article 33(2) should be interpreted narrowly. He remarked, for
example, "Not every reason of national security may be invoked, the refugee
must constitute a danger to the national security of the country. '2 10 Furthermore,
while Weis recognized that "[w]hat crimes are meant is difficult to define," he
set a high standard, noting that "capital crimes such as murder, rape, armed

in an arbitrary manner.").
203
204

Id.
Id.at 333-34.

205 Refugee Convention, supra note 2, art. 33(2) (emphasis added).
206
207

Protocol, supra note 2, art. 1(1).
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of

8 U.S.C.).
208

209

8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iv) (2012).
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii).

210 RESEARCH CTR. FOR INT'L LAW, supra note 192, at 342.
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robbery and arson are included."2 1' Another important aspect of Weis's
commentary is his view that Article 33(2) requires that "[t]wo conditions must
be fulfilled: the refugee must have ben [sic] convicted by final judgment for a
particularly serious crime, and he must constitute a danger to the community of
the country. 2 12 Underscoring the distinct nature of these requirements, Weis
noted, "a particularly serious crime, if committed in a moment of passion, may
2 13
Finally,
not necessarily constitute the refugee as a danger to the community.
by
stating
representative
U.K.
the
of
Weis's commentary echoed the perspective
2 14
words,
other
In
be
observed.
that "[t]he principle of proportionality has to
the seriousness of the crime must be balanced against the risk of persecution if
the person is sent home. UNHCR has embraced this interpretation.
UNHCR's Interpretation

B.

UNHCR has stressed that the particularly serious crime bar "applies to
refugees who become an extremely serious threatto the country of asylum due
215
to the severity of crimes perpetrated by them." In interpreting what constitutes
a particularly serious crime, UNHCR has shown concern for consistency, stating
that "the gravity of the crimes should be judged against international standards,
2 16
not simply by its categorisation in the host State or the nature of the penalty.
According to UNHCR, "[c]rimes such as petty theft or the possession for
personal use of illicit narcotic substances [do] not meet the threshold of
seriousness," while "murder, rape, arson, and armed robbery" are examples of
crimes that do. 217 UNHCR mentions various factors to be considered in
evaluating the seriousness of a crime, "includ[ing] the nature of the act, the
actual harm inflicted, the form of procedure used to prosecute the crime, and
whether most jurisdictions would consider the act in question as a serious
crime. 218 The last two factors underscore UNHCR's concern about consistency.
UNHCR notes that "[i]f it is generally understood that a 'serious crime' is a
capital or a very grave crime normally punished with long imprisonment, it
follows that a 'particularly serious crime', must belong to the gravest
219
category."

211

Id.

212

Id.
Id.
Id.

213
214

U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees (UNHCR), Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill:
7 (July 2007),
Briefing for the House of Commons at Second Reading,
(emphasis
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/576d237f7.pdf [https://perma.cc/XPL9-DUYU]
added).
215

216 Id. 10.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id. 7.
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Furthermore, UNHCR has taken the position that "[c]onviction of a
particularly serious crime in and of itself is not sufficient. 220 The person must
also be a danger to the community, which requires "an assessment of the present
orfuture danger posed by the wrong-doer. 22 1 UNHCR believes that the State
should bear the burden of showing that the person's conviction(s) "are
symptomatic of the criminal, incorrigible nature of the person and that he is
likely to do it again. 222 This view differs from the operation of immigration law
in the United States, where the respondent bears the burden of establishing
eligibility for all forms of relief from removal. In order to assess present and
future danger, UNHCR notes that the State should examine "the circumstances
of the refugee as well as the particulars of the specific offence. 223 Relevant
considerations include prospects for reform, rehabilitation, and integration into
society: "Where the refugee has responded to rehabilitative measures, or where
there are indications that the refugee can be reformed, Article 33(2) should not
apply because the potential threat to the community would have been (or could
224
be) removed.
In evaluating the seriousness of a crime, UNHCR finds it critical to consider
"the overall context of the offence, including its nature, effects and surrounding
circumstances, the offender's motives and state of mind, and the existence of
extenuating (or aggravating circumstances). 225 The reason that UNHCR wants
"all available and relevant facts [to be] carefully and comprehensively assessed"
is to ensure that the particularly serious crime determination comports with "the
highest possible standards of fairness in decision-making. 226 To further ensure
fairness, UNHCR stresses that adjudicators should "carefully balance[]"
competing considerations "relating to complicity, culpability, and mitigating or
aggravating circumstances" and ensure "that applicants are given a full
opportunity to present their claims." 227
Finally, according to UNHCR, a State must consider whether refoulement is
"a proportional response to [the] danger" posed to the security of the
community. 228 UNHCR explains that "the proportionality [test] is necessary in
order to ensure that the exception is applied in [a] manner consistent with the
overriding humanitarian object and purpose of the 1951 Convention.2 29
220
221
222

d. 11.
Id.
Id. 12.

U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002:
UNHCR Comments on the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (Specification of
Particularly Serious Crimes) Order 2004 (Nov. 2004).
223

224

225
226
227
228
229

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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UNHCR acknowledges that the concept of proportionality is not explicitly
mentioned in the Refugee Convention but stresses that "it is a fundamental
principle in international human rights [law] and international humanitarian
law. '230 In applying the proportionality test, states should bear in mind that the
particularly serious crime bar is "a measure of last resort" that goes well beyond
criminal sanctions and is justified by an "exceptional threat" that "can only be
countered by removing the person from the country of asylum." 23 1 Thus,
UJNHCR perceives the principle of proportionality as another way to promote
both consistency and fairness.
C. The BIA's Deviationfrom UNHCR's Approach
Although Congress codified the obligations in Article 33 of the Refugee
Convention using almost exactly the same language, the BIA's interpretation of
the exception in Article 33(2) departs from UNHCR's interpretation in three
significant ways. First, while UNHCR stresses that all relevant factors must be
considered, including any mitigating circumstances, the BIA has excluded
certain relevant factors from consideration. Second, while UNHCR has found
that there must be a separate assessment of present or future dangerousness, the
BIA has rejected any such assessment. 232 Third, the BIA has refused to apply
the principle of proportionality that UNHCR endorses.
1. Failing to Consider All Mitigating Factors
Beyond the per se classifications discussed above, the BIA has specifically
excluded certain individualized-and potentially mitigating-factors from the
particularly serious crime analysis. In N-A-M-, the BIA indicated that "offender
characteristics" are not important because they "may operate to reduce a
sentence but do not diminish the gravity of a crime." 233 In the Matter ofR-A-M,234 the BIA found that "potential rehabilitation is not significant to the
analysis. '235 Most recently, in G-G-S-, the BIA discussed a specific offender
characteristic that immigration judges cannot consider independently of the
230

Id.

231 Id.; see also U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND

1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967
155, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/Eng/REV. 1,
(1979, rev. 1992) (explaining that the principle of proportionality should be applied to the
serious nonpolitical crime bar).
232 See generally David Delgado, Note, Running Afoul of the Non-Refoulement Principle.
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE
PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES,

The [Mis]interpretationand [Misiapplicationof the ParticularlySerious Crime Exception,

86 S. CAL. L. REv. POSTSCRIPT 1 (2013) (arguing that the BIA's interpretation that the
particularly serious crime bar does not require a separate determination of dangerousness is
contrary to the plain meaning of the statute as well as international consensus).
233 In re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336, 343 (B.I.A. 2007).
234 25 I. & N. Dec. 657 (B.I.A. 2012).
235 Id. at 662.
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criminal court: mental health status at the time of the offense. 236 Reasoning that
fact finders in criminal proceedings "have expertise in the applicable State and
Federal criminal law, are informed by the evidence presented by the defendant
and the prosecution, and have the benefit of weighing all the factors firsthand,"
the BIA concluded that immigration judges are constrained by how mental
health issues were handled by the criminal court. 23 7
In excluding specific individualized factors, the BIA contradicts its own
precedents providing that "allreliable information may be considered in making
a particularly serious crime determination. '238 The BIA justifies excluding facts
such as mental illness by reasoning that immigration judges "cannot go behind
the decisions of the criminal judge and reassess any ruling on criminal
culpability. '239 But taking into account offender characteristics such as mental
illness, like considering other underlying facts and circumstances surrounding a
crime, is different from assessing criminal culpability. The immigration judge is
not retrying the question of guilt but assessing whether the crime is so serious as
to justify removal to a country where there is a significant risk of persecution. 240
Indeed, the BIA's concerns in G-G-S- about "going behind" a conviction are
in tension with at least one BIA decision pointing out that inquiries into the
factual circumstances surrounding a crime "are by no means unusual in removal
proceedings. '24 1 Not only has the BIA recognized that "Immigration Judges are
often called upon to examine the facts underlying a conviction to determine
whether the alien is ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal as one
convicted of a 'particularly serious crime,"' but it has noted that they routinely
do this in other contexts as well. 242 For example, certain removability
determinations require the immigration judge to engage in fact-finding about
whether the alien's conduct creates "reason to believe" that the alien has been
an illicit trafficker in a controlled substance, a human trafficker, or a money
launderer.243 Other removability grounds require the immigration judge to
determine if a fraud offense resulted in loss to the victim of more than
$10,000;244 if an offense is one "relating to a controlled substance"; 245 if a
236 In re G-G-S-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 339, 339, 345 (B.I.A. 2014).
237

Id. at 345.

238 N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 338 (emphasis added).
239 G-G-S-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 345.
240 Cf Inre L-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 645, 651 (B.I.A. 1999) ("[W]e do not engage in a retrial

of the alien's criminal case or go behind the record of conviction to redetermine the alien's
innocence or guilt.").
241 In re Dominguez-Rodriguez, 26 I. & N. Dec. 408, 413 (B.I.A. 2014).
242 Id. at 413 n.9.
243 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)(C), (H)-(I) (2012).
244 Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 38-40 (2009) (discussing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i)).
245 Rojas v. Att'y Gen. of the United States, 728 F.3d 203, 215-16 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc)

(discussing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)).
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conviction actually involved possession of marijuana for personal use; 24 6 or if
the victim of a crime of violence had a qualifying "domestic" relationship to the
offender. 247 In none of these situations has the BIA expressed concerns that the
"going behind the conviction" or engaging in a "mini-trial"
immigration judge is
248
of a criminal issue.
In addition, certain discretionary waivers require an immigration judge to
examine the circumstances relating to a crime. For example, in evaluating an
application for a waiver of a criminal ground of inadmissibility under Section
212(h) of the INA, an immigration judge must determine if the noncitizen
engaged in a "violent or dangerous crime[]," which would trigger a higher
standard, requiring the noncitizen to demonstrate either "extraordinary
249 If
circumstances" or "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship."
extraordinary circumstances exist, the immigration judge must still assess the
"gravity" of the offense to determine if a favorable exercise of discretion is
warranted.

250

Similarly, in deciding whether to grant a discretionary waiver under former
Section 212(c) of the INA, an immigration judge must examine the gravity of
the offense in order to determine if it requires showing "unusual or outstanding
equities. '251 The BIA has never precluded immigration judges from considering
specific factors, such as mental health status, in assessing the seriousness of
crimes for purposes of these waivers. Nor has the BIA excluded such factors in
assessing the gravity of a crime for purposes of the "serious nonpolitical crime"
bar to asylum and withholding. By failing to provide a cogent explanation for
why an immigration judge should not be allowed to consider certain relevant
facts in the particularly serious crime determination, the BIA opens the door to
arbitrarily excluding other types of facts from the analysis as well.
2. Dropping Dangerousness
of
A second way that the United States departs from UNHCR's interpretation 252
Article 33(2) is that it has dropped dangerousness as a distinct requirement.
As noted above, Carballe held that "those aliens who have been finally

246

Mellouli v. Holder, 719 F.3d 995, 1000-01 (8th Cir. 2013) (discussing 8 U.S.C. § 1227

(a)(2)(B)(i)); Dominguez-Rodriguez,26 I. & N. Dec. at 409-14 (same); In re Davey, 26 I. &
N. Dec. 37, 38-41 (B.I.A. 2012) (same).
247 Bianco v. Holder, 624 F.3d 265, 270-73 (5th Cir. 2010) (discussing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i)).
248 See Dominguez-Rodriguez, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 412-13 ("[T]he circumstance-specific
inquiry contemplated by the 'possession for personal use' exception does not invite
Immigration Judges to redetermine an alien's criminal guilt or innocence.").
249 8 C.F.R. § 1212.7(d) (2017).
250

Id.

251 In re Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 585-86 (B.I.A. 1978); see also In re Edwards, 20 I.

& N. Dec. 191, 196 (B.I.A. 1990); In re Buscemi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 628, 633 (B.I.A. 1988).
252 In re Carballe, 19 I. & N. Dec. 357, 360 (B.I.A. 1986).
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convicted of particularly serious crimes are presumptively dangers to
[the] . . . community. ' 253 Despite using the word "presumptively," the BIA has
not applied any type of rebuttable presumption of dangerousness based on a past
conviction for a particularly serious crime. Evidence of rehabilitation would be
highly relevant to rebutting this type of presumption, but, as mentioned above,
the BIA has found such evidence irrelevant to the analysis. 254 In eliminating any
assessment of dangerousness, the BIA relied on a House Judiciary Committee
Report that referred to "aliens... who have been convicted of particularly
serious crimes which make them a danger to the community of the United
States." 255 The BIA interprets this language as establishing a cause-and-effect
relationship between the conviction and the danger, and federal appellate courts
256
have given deference to that interpretation.
The BIA's interpretation conflicts with a letter from Senator Edward
Kennedy, then-Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and
Refugee Affairs, stating that Congress intended the statute to require a separate
finding of dangerousness to the community. 251 However, because postenactment
legislative history receives "less weight than contemporaneous commentary,"
the courts have found that any weight given to this letter is "counterbalanced by
the prepassage legislative history. '258 While the Second Circuit stated that it was
"troubled by the BIA's failure to give separate consideration to whether [the
petitioner] is a 'danger to the community,"' noting that under this interpretation
"the clause concerning 'danger to the community' might seem superfluous," it
still followed other courts and deferred to the BIA's interpretation. 259 At least
one judge on the Tenth Circuit has shared the Second Circuit's concern about
260
rendering the statutory phrase meaningless.
253

Id.

254 In re R-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 657, 662 (B.I.A. 2012).

255 Carballe,19 I. & N. Dec. at 359 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96-608, at 17 (1979)).
256 See A1-Salehi v. INS, 47 F.3d 390, 394 (10th Cir. 1995); Martins v. INS, 972 F.2d 657,
660-61 (5th Cir. 1992); Arauz v. Rivkind, 845 F.2d 271, 275 (1 lth Cir. 1988); RamirezRamos v. INS, 814 F.2d 1394, 1397 (9th Cir. 1987) ("A close reading of the language of the
statute leads us to the conclusion that the BIA's interpretation is reasonable."); see also
Ahmetovic v. INS, 62 F.3d 48, 53 (2d Cir. 1995).
257 Mosquera-Perez v. INS, 3 F.3d 553, 556 (1st Cir. 1993) (taking note of the letter to the
INS from Senator Kennedy showing that Congress "contemplated that a showing of
dangerousness to the community would be necessary in addition to proof of conviction of an
aggravated felony"); see also Delgado, supra note 232, at 32 (noting that Senator Kennedy
"specifically stated that Congress intended that the language of the statute require a separate
finding of dangerousness to the community").
258 Al-Salehi, 47 F.3d at 395 (quoting Mosquera-Perez, 3 F.3d at 558); see also Martins,
972 F.2d at 661 (rejecting the notion put forth in the Kennedy letter based on contradictory
indications of legislative intent in pre-passage legislative history).
259 Ahmetovic, 62 F.3d at 52-53 ("[T]he BIA's interpretation conflating the two
requirements has been accepted by every circuit that has considered the issue.").
260 See, e.g., N-A-M v. Holder, 587 F.3d 1052, 1061 (10th Cir. 2009) (Henry, J.,
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As a practical matter, dropping dangerousness from the analysis means that
individuals who pose no present or future danger to society can be deported to
countries where they risk being seriously harmed or killed. For example, in RA-M, where the BIA reversed the immigration judge's determination that
possession of child pornography is not a particularly serious crime, the BIA
agreed "with the Immigration Judge that there is no indication that the
respondent had ever been violent in the past"; though the BIA did not dispute
"the Immigration Judge's belief that the respondent would not be violent in the
future," the BIA found that such a belief was "not dispositive of whether his
conviction [was] for a particularly serious crime. '261 However, the BIA
dismissed these considerations because "it is not necessary to make a separate
determination whether the alien is a danger to the community. 2 62 The BIA
stressed that "[t]he focus 'is on the nature of the crime and not the likelihood of
future serious misconduct.' 263 Consequently, the respondent in that case was
found deportable to Honduras, despite having demonstrated a greater than fifty
percent chance of being persecuted there on account of his sexual orientation.
There are many other examples of situations where the failure to consider
future dangerousness could result in decisions that may be viewed as unfair.
Consider, for example, someone who committed a drug-related offense but is
now completely sober; someone whose crime was related to a mental illness but
subsequently obtained treatment and no longer poses any threat; or someone
who committed a crime under extreme emotional disturbance and is unlikely to
exhibit violent behavior again, such as an abused spouse who harmed her abuser.
The Second Circuit's decision in Ahmetovic v. INS,264 where the court indicated
that it was "troubled" by the BIA's failure to give separate consideration to
dangerousness, involved this last scenario. 265 In these situations, the past
conviction may not be any indicator of present or future dangerousness. The
wide range of crimes that the BIA has classified as particularly serious makes it
especially problematic to infer dangerousness from the conviction itself.
3.

Failure to Apply the Principle of Proportionality

The third way that the BIA departs from UNHCR's interpretation of Article
33(2) is that it does not apply the principle of proportionality. In 1985, the BIA
explicitly rejected "any interpretation of the phrases 'particularly serious crime'
and 'serious nonpolitical crime"' that "would vary with the nature of evidence
of persecution. ' '266 The BIA reasoned that it could not find anything in the

concurring).
261 In re R-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 657, 661-62 (B.I.A. 2012).
at 662.
263 Id. (quoting In re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 336, 342 (B.I.A. 2007)).
262 Id.

264 62 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 1995).

261 Id. at 52.
266 In re Rodriguez-Coto, 19 I. & N. Dec. 208, 209 (B.I.A. 1985).
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language and framework of the statute that supported this approach. 267 It also
noted that application of the exception presupposes that the individual has
already made a showing that his or her life or freedom would be threatened on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion, thereby implicitly rejecting the notion that one can--or
268
should-differentiate between different levels of persecution.
The Supreme Court affirmed the BIA's interpretation in INS v. Aguirre270
9
There, the
Aguirre,26 a case involving the serious nonpolitical crime bar.
Court reversed a Ninth Circuit decision that had relied on the UNHCR
271
Handbook in holding that the principle of proportionality should be applied.
While the Court acknowledged that "the U.N. Handbook provides some
guidance in construing the provisions added to the INA by the Refugee Act," it
stressed that the Handbook is not binding on the BIA or federal courts. 272 The
Court found that the Ninth Circuit should have given Chevron deference to the
BIA's interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term, noting that the text and
structure of the statutory section addressing a "serious nonpolitical crime" were
consistent with the BIA's conclusion. 273 The Court explained that "[a]s a matter
of plain language, it is not obvious that an already-completed crime is somehow
rendered less serious by considering the further circumstances that the alien may
be subject to persecution if returned to his home country. ' 274 The Court found it
reasonable for the BIA to decide that the risk of persecution can be considered
on its own as a prerequisite for withholding of removal and need not also be
considered as a factor in determining whether the offense is a serious
275
nonpolitical crime.
Despite finding it reasonable to reject the principle of proportionality in this
context, the Supreme Court routinely applies this principle in its Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. At first glance, these may seem like two unrelated
areas of law, but, as immigration scholars have observed, the underlying
concerns are quite similar.276 In the criminal context, the proportionality

267

Id.

268

Id.

269 526 U.S. 415 (1999).
270
271
272
273
274

Id. at 426.
Id. at 426-28.
Id. at 427.
Id. at 425.
Id. at 426.

275 Id.
276 For articles arguing that the principle of proportionality should be applied to
immigration law, see Angela M. Banks, ProportionalDeportation,55 WAYNE L. REv. 1651,
1673-81 (2009) (arguing for greater proportionality in review of removal decisions grounded
in both domestic law and international obligations); Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1728-38 (2009) (providing a proposal for introducing
proportionality into immigration law); Maureen A. Sweeney, Fact or Fiction: The Legal
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principle-protects a defendant from being sentenced to a disproportionately long
period of incarceration or receiving the death penalty; in the refugee context, the
proportionality principle would help protect someone from receiving the
disproportionate penalty of being deported to a country where there is a serious
risk of persecution or death. This parallel becomes even more powerful when
one takes into account that the United States has construed some of its
international obligations to be consistent with its obligations under the Eighth
Amendment. Specifically, when ratifying the Convention Against Torture
("CAT"), which prohibits deporting noncitizens to countries where there is a
likelihood of torture, the United States entered a reservation interpreting the
phrase "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" to mean "the
cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth,
Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
277
States."
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized the deep roots of the
principle of proportionality, noting that it was expressed in Magna Carta, applied
for centuries by English courts, and embodied in the English Bill of Rights using
the same language that was later adopted in the Eighth Amendment. 278 The
Court's own precedents have explicitly recognized the principle of
proportionality for over a century. 279 Not only has the Court applied the principle
of proportionality to the death penalty, imprisonment, bail, fines, and other
punishments, but it has also applied it outside the criminal context. The Court
has explained that "the notion of punishment, as we commonly understand it,
cuts across the division between the civil and the criminal law." 2 80 In the Court's
view, "a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial

Construction of Immigration Removal for Crimes, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 47, 84-86 (2010)

(proposing that the Eighth Amendment standard of proportionality be applied to removal
proceedings); Michael J. Wishnie, ImmigrationLaw and the ProportionalityRequirement, 2
U.C. IRvINE L. REv. 415, 435-41 (2012) (arguing that removal orders are subject to
constitutional proportionality review); Michael J. Wishnie, Proportionality:The Strugglefor
Balance in U.S. Immigration Policy, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 431, 457 (2011) (suggesting that
Fifth and Eighth Amendment proportionality principles apply to removal orders).
277 136 CONG. REc. 36,198 (1990).
278 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983) ("The principle that a punishment should be
proportionate to the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law
jurisprudence.").

279 Id. at 289 (stating that punishment by both imprisonment and death are subject to
proportionality analysis); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 362, 367 (1910) (stating "it
is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to
offense" and holding that a fifteen-year sentence to hard labor in chains was a disproportionate
punishment for falsifying a public document); see also United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S.
321, 334 (1998) ("The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive Fines

Clause is the principle of proportionality: The amount of the forfeiture must bear some
relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish.").
280 United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1989).
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purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or
deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term."2 8 1
For example, the Court has recognized that civil forfeiture constitutes
282
punishment and is subject to the Eighth Amendment's excessive fines clause.
In recent decades, the Court has clarified that the Eighth Amendment does not
require strict proportionality but prohibits extreme sentences that are grossly
disproportionate to the crime. 283 This interpretation transfers well to the refugee
context, where the idea is that the extreme penalty of being sent to a country
where there is a serious risk of persecution or death is a disproportionate penalty
for certain crimes. The Court has identified several factors that help compare the
gravity of the offense to the harshness of the penalty. These include the harm
threatened or caused to the victim, the sentence imposed, the mens rea required
for the offense, and the defendant's motive in committing the crime. 284 The
Court has also found the personal characteristics of the offender relevant to the
proportionality analysis. 285 Especially in capital cases, "a defendant has wide
latitude to raise as a mitigating factor 'any aspect of [his or her] character or
record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as
a basis for a sentence less than death."' 286 By contrast, the BIA has excluded
offender characteristics, even if they are mitigating factors such as mental
illness, from consideration in deciding whether someone should be deported to
287
a country where he or she could be killed.
The Supreme Court considers certain characteristics so significant that they
create categorical restrictions in the implementation of the proportionality
standard. For example, in Atkins v. Virginia,288 the Court held that the death
penalty cannot be imposed on defendants whose intellectual functioning is in a
low range. 289 In Roper v. Simmons, the Court held that the death penalty cannot
281 Id. at 448.
282 Austin v. United States,

509 U.S. 602, 619 (1993).

283 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30 (2003) (plurality opinion) (holding that Gary

Ewing's sentence of twenty-five years to life in prison for the offense of felony grand theft
under California's three strikes law was not grossly disproportionate and therefore did not
violate the Eighth Amendment); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) ("The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime
and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to

the crime.").
284 Solem, 463 U.S. at 292-93.
285 See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012); United States v. LaBonte,
520 U.S. 751, 764 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The [Sentencing] Guidelines divide
sentencing factors into two basic categories: "offense" characteristics and "offender"
characteristics.").
286 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
604 (1978) (plurality opinion)).
287 See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
288 536 U.S. 304 (2002).

289

Id. at 311 (explaining that proportionality review should be conducted under the
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291
be imposed on juveniles. 290 In Graham v. Florida, the Court concluded that
the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposing a life sentence without possibility of
292
parole for a juvenile convicted of a nonhomicide offense. Similarly, in Miller
93
v. Alabama, the Court held that "[b]y requiring that all children convicted of
homicide receive lifetime incarceration without possibility of parole, regardless
of their age and age-related characteristics and the nature of their crimes, the
mandatory sentencing schemes before us violate [the] principle of
and so the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
proportionality,
294
punishment.
Incorporating the principle of proportionately into the particularly serious
crime analysis could lead to different outcomes in a subset of cases where the
risk of persecution is particularly high, where deportation is likely to result in
death, or where the noncitizen has certain characteristics that make him or her
uniquely vulnerable to harm. For instance, incorporating this principle may
require a noncitizen to demonstrate a ninety percent chance of future persecution
instead of the fifty-one percent chance required for withholding of removal. This
could be the case if it is known that government officials are prepared to arrest
and seriously harm the individual upon arrival.
Or perhaps the risk of persecution is not exceptional, but the harm feared
involves being tortured or killed, not just detained or beaten. In this situation,
protection under CAT is not always available because CAT has different
295
CAT requires showing
requirements than asylum or withholding of removal.
that the torture is intentional and that it would be inflicted by the government or
296
If all of these
with the government's acquiescence, for certain purposes.
criteria are not met, then protection under CAT will be denied. Without applying
the principle of proportionality, someone convicted of misdemeanor sale of
marijuana, possession of child pornography, or misdemeanor indecent
exposure-all of which have been297characterized as particularly serious crimescould be sent to his or her death.

evolving standards of decency).
290 Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
291

560 U.S. 48 (2010).

292

Id. at 59 ("The Court's cases addressing the proportionality of sentences fall within two

general classifications. The first involves challenges to the length of term-of-years sentences
given all the circumstances in a particular case. The second comprises cases in which the
Court implements the proportionality standard by certain categorical restrictions on the death
penalty.").
293 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).

Id. at 2475.
295 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (2017).
296 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1).
297 Singh v. Gonzales, 233 F. App'x 634, 637 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that the BIA
determined that indecent exposure was a particularly serious crime); In re R-A-M-, 25 I. &
N. Dec. 657, 660 (B.I.A. 2012) (concluding that possession of child pornography is
intrinsically a particularly serious offense); In re Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 274-75 (Att'y
294
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Finally, the noncitizen could be uniquely vulnerable to harm, perhaps because
of age or due to a serious mental or physical illness. Most individuals with a
mental or physical illness who apply for asylum and withholding of removal
have an independent basis for fearing persecution, separate from their illness.
This is because they must show that the feared persecution is on account of race,
religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social
group, and courts have been reluctant to recognize mental or physical illness as
the basis for membership in a particular social group. 298 Even if a social group
is recognized, it is often difficult to show that the harm feared is "on account of'
the mental or physical illness.2 99 Applying the principle of proportionality in
such cases would allow an immigration judge to take into consideration the
additional measure of suffering an individual with a serious mental or physical
illness would sustain-above and beyond showing a well-founded fear of future
persecution-before issuing a deportation order based on a particularly serious
crime.
The foregoing demonstrates that the BIA has parted ways with UNHCR's
interpretation of the particularly serious crime bar by failing to consider all
mitigating factors, dropping dangerousness from the analysis, and rejecting the
principle of proportionality. This Section has also shown that UNHCR has
endorsed the individual approach with the belief that this approach will promote
consistency and fairness. As discussed below, however, an individualized
analysis may not actually be the best way to achieve these goals.

Gen. 2002) (finding that drug trafficking is presumptively a particularly serious crime).
298 The BIA requires an immutable characteristic, social distinction, and particularity to
establish a particular social group. See Temu v. Holder, 740 F.3d 887, 890, 896-97 (4th Cir.
2014) ("I conclude that the [immigration judge] and Board's determinations... are not
manifestly contrary to the law or an abuse of discretion. No adequate benchmark exists for
determining whether an individual is a member of a group defined as 'bipolar individuals in
Tanzania who engage in erratic behavior.' ... There is no discernible basis for readily
identifying an individual as being part of the proposed group or not.... Temu's proposed
group would fail to satisfy all the required characteristics of a particular social group ....
");
In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 232-33 (B.I.A. 2014); In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec.
208, 209-12 (B.I.A. 2014).
299 See Raffington v. INS, 340 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir. 2003) (rejecting "mentally ill
Jamaicans" as a particular social group, finding it too large and diverse to qualify, and finding

that "Raffington failed to present a prima facie case that the mentally ill or mentally ill females
are being or have been persecuted in Jamaica on account of this shared characteristic"); see
also Mendoza-Alvarez v. Holder, 714 F.3d 1161, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 2013) (rejecting "insulindependent diabetics who suffer from mental illnesses," finding that it lacked particularity);
Khan v. Att'y Gen. of the United States, 691 F.3d 488, 496-97 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that

lack of access to mental health treatment in Pakistan did not create a well-founded fear of
persecution).
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POSSIBLE PATHS FORWARD

The previous two Parts demonstrate that the BIA's approach to the
particularly serious crime bar follows neither the categorical approach used to
analyze other convictions that are bars to relief under the INA, nor UNHCR's
approach, which requires a robust, individualized analysis. This Part explores
three possible alternatives to the BIA's current test, examining the pros and cons
of each. These alternatives are: (1) applying the categorical approach; (2)
applying the categorical approach to the conviction combined with an
individualized assessment of dangerousness; and (3) applying a completely
individualized approach. This Part concludes that the categorical approach,
while imperfect, is the best way to promote consistency, fairness, and
predictability.
A.

Applying the CategoricalApproach

The categorical approach has many benefits, which is why it has been applied
to the grounds for removal and bars to relief for over a century. As Das has
explained, the categorical approach provides a measure of due process in an
immigration system where there is no right to appointed counsel, where many
respondents are detained without access to attorneys or legal resources,00 and
By
where there are no rules of evidence to constrain the Government.
a
only
of
emphasizing the statute of conviction and allowing consideration
limited set of documents (the record of conviction), the categorical approach
helps noncitizens prepare for court without wondering what evidence the
government will try to introduce against them or worrying about how the judge
will subjectively weigh that evidence.
In addition, the categorical approach makes the immigration consequences of
a criminal plea much more predictable. Under this approach, a noncitizen would
be able to determine, before pleading guilty to an offense, whether the conviction
will bar her from asylum or withholding of removal if she is placed in removal
proceedings. This is an important concern not only for defendants, but also for
criminal defense attorneys because the Supreme Court's decision in Padillav.
Kentucky 0 1 requires them to provide advice about the30 2 immigration
consequences of convictions in order to be effective as counsel.
The categorical approach has not always been easy to use due to circuit splits
on important issues such as when to apply the modified categorical approach
and whether judges may consult evidence outside the record of conviction to
3
determine if an offense constitutes a CIMT.30 However, recent Supreme Court
cases and the 2015 Silva-Trevino II opinion have resolved much of the
confusion, clarifying how and when to apply the categorical and modified
300 Das, supra note 12, at 1728-29.
301 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
302 Id. at 374.
303 Koh, supra note 68, at 297.
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categorical approaches. This clarification makes the outcome of the categorical
analysis even more predictable than before.
The resolution of these circuit splits also means that the categorical approach
will promote even greater uniformity in the immigration consequences of a
conviction. This approach ensures that noncitizens convicted under the same
state statute are treated identically and that defendants convicted of the same
elements will face the same immigration consequences. Indeed, uniformity is
one of the main reasons that courts have applied the categorical approach for so
long. 3°4 This does not mean, however, that using a categorical approach
eliminates all inconsistencies. It still produces some inconsistency in the sense
that two people who engaged in basically the same criminal conduct can be
treated differently under the categorical approach because of variations in how
state statutes are drafted.
Judicial efficiency is yet another advantage of the categorical approach, as
immigration judges can make a legal determination about the effect of a
conviction without taking any testimony or considering any evidence outside the
record of conviction. This is an important consideration because U.S.
immigration courts are extremely overloaded; each judge has thousands of cases
and little time per case, leading to high levels of stress and burnout. 305 This
reality affects the ability of immigration judges to provide the type of robust,
individualized analysis that takes into consideration all mitigating factors
envisioned by UNHCR. In such a high-pressure situation, judges may not be
able to hear all relevant evidence and may perceive the evidence they do hear
through a distorted lens; they are more likely to rely on cognitive shortcuts and
implicit biases in evaluating the facts, which can undermine rather than promote
306
fairness.
Lastly, a categorical approach provides an extra layer of protection to
noncitizens in a system that is stacked against them. It would transform the
particularly serious crime determination into a strictly legal question that would
be reviewed de novo by the circuit courts, as opposed to being reviewed under
the abuse of discretion standard or substantial evidence standard that some
courts have decided to apply to the BIA's current test. Given the extreme
consequences of the particularly serious crime determination-which can
include deportation to one's death-de novo review by an appellate court could
be a lifesaving measure. At the same time, however, it should be noted that de

10 See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 590-91 (1990); Das, supra note 12, at 1676;
Koh, supra note 68, at 261 (critiquing the multiple interpretations of the categorical
approach).
305 See Stuart L. Lustig et al., Inside the Judges' Chambers:NarrativeResponsesfrom the
NationalAssociation of ImmigrationJudges Stress andBurnoutSurvey, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
57, 79 (2008).
306 See Fatma E. Marouf, Implicit Bias andImmigrationCourts, 45 NEw ENG. L. REv. 417,
417 (2011) (discussing the ways that immigration administrative judges are implicitly biased
in their decisions due to the structure of the system).
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novo judicial review may undermine the efficiency that comes from not
considering factual evidence because the circuit courts would end up investing
more time reviewing particularly serious crime determinations and could
potentially remand more cases to the BIA on this issue than they do now.
Applying the categorical approach to the particularly serious crime
determination also has some potential drawbacks from the immigrant's
perspective. Most importantly, it limits the flexibility of an adjudicator to decide
that a conviction that appears serious on paper should not trigger the bar based
on the individualized facts and circumstances. For example, an assault
conviction may look disqualifying, but if the facts indicated that this was a
mutual fight and that both parties had been convicted, a judge might view the
offense in a different light. 30 7 Similarly, a domestic violence conviction might
be viewed differently if it turned out that the noncitizen convicted of domestic
violence was also a victim of this offense. In this sense, the categorical approach
can be overinclusive, sweeping in individuals who may not be truly dangerous.
At the same time, the categorical approach can be underinclusive, letting
people remain in the country who actually do pose a danger and perhaps should
be deported. Once the elements of a particularly serious crime are identified,
there will always be a chance that certain crimes that appear particularly serious
fail to include one or more of them. This could occur because the crime is an
unusual one or because a specific state omits an element that would be expected
for that type of crime.
Therefore, the challenge with applying a categorical approach to the
particularly serious crime determination is coming up with the right elements.
This Article proposes three elements that draw on the BIA's precedents but also
incorporate UNHCR's concerns about proportionality and dangerousness. The
first proposed element is the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force
against a person. This element is based on the first part of the definition of a
"crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16, but limits it to crimes against
persons. 30 8 Crimes against property are not included in order to uphold the
principle of proportionality, under the theory that exposing a person to serious
See Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462, 464-65 (7th Cir. 2006).
308 The proposed element does not incorporate the second part of the definition of a crime
of violence, which is "any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a
substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in
the course of committing the offense." 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2012). The Supreme Court recently
held that identical language in the Armed Career Criminal Act was unconstitutionally vague,
violating due process. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015). Commentators
have also long criticized the second part of the crime of violence definition as subject to
different interpretations. See, e.g., Timothy M. Mulvaney, Note, CategoricalApproach or
307

Categorical Chaos? A Critical Analysis of the Inconsistencies in Determining Whether

Felony DWI Is a Crime of Violence for Purposes of Deportation Under 18 US.C. § 16, 48
VILL. L. REv. 697, 701-11 (2003) (discussing the various conclusions that courts have drawn
about whether felony driving while intoxicated is a "crime of violence" under 18
U.S.C. § 16(b)).
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physical harm by deporting them to a country where there is a high risk of
persecution is a disproportionate penalty for a crime against property.
The second proposed element is the use of a dangerous weapon or force that
is likely to produce serious bodily harm or death. This element further narrows
the types of crimes that can be deemed particularly serious to the gravest and
most dangerous offenses. It also helps uphold the principle of proportionality,
allowing someone to be exposed to serious physical harm only if that person
first used force likely to cause serious physical harm. Indeed, this Article argues
that deporting someone to a country where there is a risk of persecution or death
for an offense that does not involve a violent act is analogous to allowing capital
punishment for a nonviolent offense. By 1776, nonviolent offenses had been
removed from the list of capital crimes in the United States. 30 9 By analogy,
immigration judges should not be able to order someone deported to a country
where his or life is threatened for a nonviolent offense.
The third proposed element is intent. The conviction need not require
malicious intent, but some type of intent should be necessary. This would
eliminate crimes that are based on recklessness or negligence. Intent, like the
other two elements proposed above, helps satisfy the principle of
proportionality, as a person should not be intentionally exposed to serious harm
due to a reckless or negligent act. Intent is also critical if the conviction itself is
to be the basis for assessing dangerousness. If someone negligently or recklessly
injures another person, then the conviction may have resulted from an
unfortunate accident that is unlikely to recur, and the person may pose no real
danger to society. At the very least, the person does not pose the sort of danger
that justifies being deported to a country where there is a serious risk of
persecution.
Including these three elements would help ensure that only the gravest
offenses will fall under the particularly serious crime bar and would help prevent
the categorical approach from being overinclusive. Alternatively, the BIA could
decide that a particularly serious crime must have an element indicating that the
offense involved danger. This approach would be similar to the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the aggravated felony bar at issue in Kawashima, where the
Court held that an element could "involve" fraud or deceit without using those
precise words.31 0 Relatively few statutes may include "danger" as an element,
but they may have other elements showing that the offense clearly placed
someone in danger. The risk with this approach is that the resulting classification
may be overinclusive. In this situation, this Article argues that it is better to err
on the side of underinclusiveness than overinclusiveness. Principles such as the
rule of lenity, which requires ambiguous immigration statutes to be construed

309 RON FR!DELL, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 13 (2004)

(noting that in modem times the
Supreme Court has further narrowed the list of capital crimes to a very select few).
310 Kawashima v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1166, 1170 (2012).
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favorably to noncitizens, also support being underinclusive 311rather than
overinclusive when the risk associated with deportation is so high.
In addition to requiring these elements, the particularly serious crime bar
should be limited to convictions that are felonies. As both the BIA and UNHCR
have recognized,312a "particularly serious crime" must be more serious than a
"serious crime."
Because the terms "misdemeanor" and "felony" reflect
degrees of seriousness, it would not be logical for a misdemeanor to be deemed
"particularly serious" when it represents the lower level of severity for a certain
type of crime. Limiting "particularly serious crimes" to felonies also makes it
clear to criminal defense attorneys that any misdemeanor plea is a "safe harbor"
with respect to this bar.
Under this proposal, many offenses that the BIA has deemed particularly
serious crimes would remain so, including, but not limited to, murder, firstdegree assault, and armed robbery. However, it would also narrow the range of
crimes that the BIA has classified as particularly serious, eliminating crimes
against property, crimes against the interests of justice, and victimless crimes.
One should also keep in mind that many crimes that do not have all of the
elements described above (such as drug trafficking) would still be classified as
felonies,
particularly serious crimes under the INA by virtue of being aggravated
313
barring withholding of removal if the sentence is at least five years.
B. Combining a Categoricaland FactualAnalysis
A second approach would be to apply the categorical approach to the
conviction, as discussed above, but also require an individualized assessment of
dangerousness. This method would offer some of the benefits of the categorical
approach, such as greater predictability and consistency in the treatment of
crimes, while also affording an individualized assessment with respect to the
primary concern behind the particularly serious crime bar: danger.
This individualized assessment could help correct the overinclusive aspects
of the categorical approach and be more in line with UNHCR's interpretation
that dangerousness is a distinct requirement. It would prevent noncitizens who
Scholars have drawn parallels between the "rule of lenity" as it is known in criminal
proceedings and the principle of construing laws in favor of noncitizens in immigration
proceedings. See Peter L. Markowitz, Deportationis Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299,
1321-25 (2011) (discussing the application of the traditional criminal rule of lenity doctrines
to deportation proceedings); Brian G. Slocum, Canons, the Plenary Power Doctrine, and
Immigration Law, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 363, 372-73 (2007) (stating the rule of lenity was
"[diesigned by the Court to protect a vulnerable minority"); see also INS v. Elias-Zacarias,
502 U.S. 478, 487-88 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting the Court's decisions directing
courts to apply the rule of lenity in immigration proceedings); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333
U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (applying the rule of lenity to deportation proceedings by "resolv[ing] []
doubts in favor of [the] construction [that favors the alien] because deportation is a drastic
measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile").
312 In re Frentescu, 18 I. & N. Dec. 244, 245-46 (B.I.A. 1982).
313 See 8 U.S.C. § 123 l(b)(3)(B) (2012).
311
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have been rehabilitated or who committed violent acts in unique circumstances
or emotional states that are unlikely to recur from being deported to countries
where they face a risk of serious harm. The abused spouse who committed a
violent act against the abuser or the individual with mental illness who
committed a crime before receiving proper treatment would have an opportunity
to demonstrate that they pose no future danger to the community. If this
approach were adopted, it might be possible for the elements to be relaxed (for
example, not requiring force likely to result in serious bodily injury), because
the elements are not being relied upon to satisfy the dangerousness requirement.
This combination of a categorical and individualized determination is not
unprecedented. The case that best exemplifies this mode of analysis is the
Supreme Court's 2009 decision in Nijhawan v. Holder,314 which examined the
aggravated felony ground that applies if a noncitizen is convicted of "an offense
that... involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the ...victims exceeds
$10,000.''315 The Court applied the categorical approach to the "fraud or deceit"
requirement but held that the $10,000 loss threshold refers to the specific
circumstances in which the offender committed the crime, rather than to an
element of the crime. 316 The Court emphasized that the words "in which" can
refer to the conduct involved in the commission of the offense, rather than the
elements of the offense. 317 In addition, the Court reasoned that most statutory
offenses do not have a specific loss amount as an element, so the provision
would be largely pointless unless the loss amount called for circumstance318
specific application.
The BIA also used this type of approach that combines a categorical and
factual analysis in In re Babaisakov, 319 which interpreted the same aggravated
felony ground that was at issue in Nijhawan.320 There, the BIA explained that a
ground for removal might require proof of a conviction tied to the statutory
elements of a criminal offense as well as proof of additional facts that are not
tied to those statutory elements. Like the Supreme Court, the BIA found that
adjudicators are not limited to the record of conviction in determining the
nonelement facts. 32 1 Thus, adjudicators may consider restitution orders,
testimony, and any other reliable evidence that bears on the loss to the victim. 322
The BIA explained:

557 U.S. 29 (2009).
Id. at 29 (emphasis added) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) (2012)).
316 Id. at 40.
317 Id.at 32 (holding that fraud and deceit must be more broadly defined than simply crimes
that contain such words in their elements).
318 Id. at 37-38.
319 In re Babaisakov, 24 I. & N. Dec. 306 (B.I.A.2007).
320 Id. at 309.
314

315

321

Id

322

Id at 321.
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[B]ecause we are looking for a fact that was part of the crime, but not a fact
that must have been proved to establish guilt, the independent assessment
of that fact during a removal hearing does not encroach on the principal
purpose of the criminal proceedings, which323was the determination of guilt
under the elements of the criminal statute.

This approach is tricky, however, and has been heavily criticized by
immigration scholars because it is difficult to discern when the INA is referring
to a fact versus an element of the crime, thereby eroding the predictability and
consistency that a strictly categorical approach provides. 324 In another case, In
re Gertsenshteyn,32 5 where the BIA tried to apply a combination approach, its
analysis was rejected by the Second Circuit. In that case, the BIA interpreted an
aggravated felony provision that applies to a noncitizen convicted of an offense
relating to transportation for purposes of prostitution if "committed for
commercial advantage." 326 The BIA found that "committed for commercial
advantage" was not an element of the offense or a basis for sentence
enhancement and, therefore, required the circumstances of the specific crime to
be considered. 327 It noted that only three federal statutes required "commercial
advantage" as an element. 328 Furthermore, the BIA distinguished the
"commercial advantage" language from length of sentence restrictions by
pointing out that "only the latter can readily be ascertained by consulting
conviction records.

'329

The BIA concluded that parties must be able to offer

evidence outside of the record of conviction to keep the "commercial advantage"
language from being a nullity. 330 While the BIA recognized that allowing the
immigration judge to examine the underlying nature of the offense might cause
"some burden to the system," it nevertheless gave effect to the language used by
Congress.

331

The Second Circuit rejected the BIA's reasoning in Gertsenshteyn, stressing
the categorical approach follows from Congress's use of the word
that the use of
"convicted. '332 The court found that it was improper for the BIA to abandon the
traditional categorical approach for "practical" reasons, such as the small
Id.
321See, e.g., Das, supra note 12, at 1694; Koh, supra note 68, at 260; Rebecca Sharpless,
Towards a True Elements Test: Taylor andthe CategoricalAnalysis of Crimes in Immigration
Law, 62 U. MIAI L. REv. 979 passim (2008) (arguing against allowing immigration
adjudicators to make findings of fact about the manner in which a crime was committed).
325 24 I. & N. Dec. 111 (B.I.A. 2007), rev'd sub nom. Gertsenshteyn v. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, 544 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2008).
323

326
327

Id. at 111.
Id. at 113-14.

328 Id.
329 Id.at
330
331

115.
Id.at 115-16.
Id.at 116.

332 Gertsenshteyn v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 544 F.3d 137, 145 (2d Cir. 2008).
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number of statutes that include "commercial advantage" as an element of the

crime. 333 Not only did the court dispute that only a few statutes implicate this
aggravated felony ground, but, more importantly, it stressed that the
Government finding it difficult to prove that a conviction falls within the
statutory definition of aggravated felony "is no reason for immigration courts to
33 4
renounce the restrictions that the courts have said the law requires.
Because the combination approach has only been accepted in Nijhawan and
Babaisakov, which interpret the same aggravated felony ground, it may be a
risky way to approach the particularly serious crime bar. The argument would
be that the phrase "having been convicted of a particularly serious crime" is a
subordinate clause, and "the alien ... constitutes a danger to the community" is
an independent clause that requires a separate fact-specific inquiry. 335 The
statutory language in cases involving the particularly serious crime bar is not as
clear as the sentence that was parsed in Nijhawan and Babaisakov, which used
the words "in which."
Separate from the questions of statutory interpretation that this combination
approach raises, there are also practical concerns about making individualized

fact-specific findings about future dangerousness. To begin with, although
predictions about long-term dangerousness are extremely common in the legal
system, studies have shown that they are not very accurate or reliable. 336 In the
333 Id.
334

Id. at 148.

335 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(b)(3)(A)(ii), (iv)

(2012).

336 See Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Danger at the Edge of Chaos:

PredictingViolent Behavior in a Post-Daubert World, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1845, 1846-48,
1849-50, 1868-79 (2003) (discussing the weaknesses of psychiatric predictions about future
dangerousness and exploring the usefulness of alternative methods); Erica Beecher-Monas,
The Epistemology of Prediction: Future Dangerousness Testimony and Intellectual Due
Process,60 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 353, 372-78 (2003) (discussing what is wrong with clinical
predictions of dangerousness and why admitting them into capital sentencing proceedings
violates basic premises of the rule of law); M. Neil Browne & Ronda R. Harrison-Spoerl,
Putting Expert Testimony in Its EpistemologicalPlace: What Predictions of Dangerousness
in Court Can Teach Us, 91 MARQ. L. REv. 1119, 1123 (2008) (challenging the assumption
that predictions of violence are "sufficiently objective, neutral, or 'true' to warrant anything
but a wary acceptance in the judicial system"); Bernard L. Diamond, The Psychiatric
Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 439 (1974) (discussing psychiatrists'
difficulties in predicting dangerousness); Randy K. Otto, On the Ability of Mental Health
Professionals to "Predict Dangerousness": A Commentary on Interpretations of the
"Dangerousness"Literature, 18 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 43, 67-68 (1994) ("Despite 25 years
of research, social scientists have barely scratched the surface of risk assessment as a
predictive tool."); Eugenia T. La Fontaine, Note, A Dangerous Preoccupationwith Future
Danger: Why Expert Predictions of Future Dangerousness in Capital Cases are
Unconstitutional,44 B.C. L. REv. 207, 233-36 (2002) (discussing the reliability and accuracy
of psychiatric expert testimony of future dangerousness and arguing that heightened standards
of reliability and accuracy should be used when determining the admissibility of evidence at
the sentencing phases of capital trials).
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criminal justice system, dangerousness predictions are made in bail, pretrial
detention, sentencing, prison administration, parole, and early release decisions.
Similarly, in the immigration system, dangerousness predictions are made in
detention and bond decisions, as well as for various waivers, forms of relief, and
certain bars to relief. For example, there is the bar to withholding of removal
that applies if "there are reasonable grounds to believe that the alien is a danger
to the security of the United States." 337 The Supreme Court has stated that "from
a legal point of view there is nothing inherently unattainable about a prediction
that "[s]uch a judgment forms an
of future criminal conduct," recognizing
338
important element in many decisions."
Although the legal system often depends on the expertise of psychiatrists in
assessing future dangerousness, psychiatrists themselves have questioned the
reliability of such predictions. In 1983, the American Psychiatric Association
published a Statement on Prediction of Dangerousness, which acknowledged
that "[s]tudies have shown that even with patients in which there is a history of
violent acts, predictions of future violence will be wrong for two out of every
three patients. '339 Psychiatric assessments of future dangerousness are normally
based on the identification of various factors associated with potential dangerous
behavior, including "the context, opportunity, frequency, intensity, and severity
of past dangerous behavior; identification of circumstances and stimuli that
trigger dangerous behavior such as substance abuse or intoxication, paranoid
psychosis, work conflicts, economic problems, interpersonal relationship
difficulties, or loss of loved one (real or imagined), and recidivism." 340 However,
even today, disagreements exist about whether it is best to rely on general risk
factors; a clinician's individualized assessment of dangerousness; or a structural
clinical assessment that uses a checklist of sorts, to ensure that the clinician takes
into consideration various factors and gives them proper weight.341 Newer

8 U.S.C. § 123 1(b)(3)(B)(iv).
318 Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278 (1984); see also Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880,
902-03 (1983) (holding that the use of psychiatrists in death penalty cases to prove
311

premeditation was legally permissible); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275 (1976) (plurality
opinion) ("[A]ny sentencing authority must predict a convicted person's probable future
conduct when it engages in the process of determining what punishment to impose.");
Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 114 n.5 (1966) (noting that diagnosis of criminal insanity
can be used to predict future propensity to commit crime).
131 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, FACT SHEET: VIOLENCE AND MENTAL ILLNESS (1998) (quoting
AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, STATEMENT ON PREDICTION OF DANGEROUSNESS (1983)).

'40 Robert T. M. Phillips, Predicting the Risk of Future Dangerousness, 14 AM. MED.
Ass'N J. ETHICS 472, 474 (2012) (noting that a clinician's predictive ability for future
criminality is a controversial subject for scholars).
341 Id.; see also A. Bauer et al., Reflections on Dangerousnessand Its Prediction-A Truly
Tantalizing Task?, 21 MED. & L. 495, 506-16 (2002) (reviewing existing theory and
knowledge on risk assessment and prediction and explaining the shortcomings of different
approaches).
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techniques that draw on developments in genetics and neuroscience are also
342

plagued with problems.
In immigration court, where at least forty percent of noncitizens are
unrepresented, relatively few will be able to afford a psychiatric expert to
prepare an evaluation or testify about future dangerousness for purposes of the
particularly serious crime bar. 343 Nor is the Government likely to pay for an
expert of its own. Therefore, in most cases, immigration judges would be making
dangerousness assessments on their own. As noted above, they already do this
for bond determinations and certain other types of decisions, but less is usually
at stake in those decisions than deportation to a country where a serious risk of
future persecution has been established. Allowing judges to rely on their own
highly subjective assessment of dangerousness without the benefit of any
psychiatric expertise may also result in discrimination against certain groups that
are stereotyped as dangerous, such as individuals with mental illness.344

Because an adjudicator's assessment of dangerousness is highly subjective, it
is also unpredictable. Adding this component of unpredictability, therefore,
undercuts one of the major benefits of applying the categorical approach.
Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Genetic Predictions of Future
Dangerousness:Is There a Blueprintfor Violence?, 69 LAW & CONTEMIP. PROBS. 301, 332342

39 (2006) (examining the problems of predicting violence based on genetic information);
Adam Lamparello, Using Cognitive Neuroscience to PredictFuture Dangerousness, 42
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 481, 533-39 (2011) (discussing and responding to potential
objections about the use of cognitive neuroscience in assisting with dangerousness
determinations).
14 See Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in
Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (2015).
34 Research has yielded inconsistent and conflicting results about whether there is a
significant association between mental illness and violence. See Michael A. Norko &
Madelon V. Baranoski, The Prediction of Violence; Detection of Dangerousness, 8 BRIEF
TREATMENT & CRISIS INTERVENTION 73, 76 (2008) (offering data showing that the
combination of drug use with mental illness as increasing the likelihood of violence, but that
mental illness alone is less clear as a predictor). Even if such an association exists, however,
it is uncontested that most individuals with mental illness are not violent and most violent
individuals do not have mental illness; in fact, studies have shown that socio-demographic
factors contribute significantly more to violence than mental health factors. See AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, supra note 339, at 1-3; Edward P. Mulvey, Assessing the Evidence of a
Link Between Mental Illness and Violence, 45 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 663, 665
(1994) (finding that socioeconomic factors or history of violence are much more predictive
of violent behavior); see also John W. Parry, The Death Penalty and Persons with Mental
Disabilities:A Lethal Dose of Stigma, Sanism, Fear of Violence, and Faulty Predictions of
Dangerousness, 29 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 667, 667 (2005) (arguing that
the finding of dangerousness "is a disgraceful sham, particularly when applied to persons who
already are stigmatized, feared by society, and often viewed by judges and jurors as being
dangerous before sentencing even begins"). See generally JOHN WESTON PARRY, MENTAL
DISABILITY, VIOLENCE, AND FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS: MYTHS BEHIND THE PRESUMPTION OF

GUILT (2013).
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Defendants will no longer have peace of mind knowing that, by agreeing to a
certain plea agreement, they are not forfeiting their eligibility for asylum or
withholding of removal. They will also have to worry about whether or not the
immigration judge will perceive them as dangerous. And they will be left
wondering what evidence the Government might produce to try to portray them
as dangerous.
Another practical concern with adopting an approach that requires an
individualized assessment of dangerousness is efficiency. As one federal judge
noted, "[a] separate determination of an alien's potential dangerousness would
require a prediction as to an alien's potential for recidivism and would lead to
extensive, drawn-out hearings complete with psychological evaluations and
expert testimony. '345 On the other hand, former BIA Member Rosenberg has
argued that "[dangerousness] determinations are routinely made in other
contexts, such as bond determinations, with little or no evidentiary display or
legal argument and, consequently, with little or no delay.

' 346

While Rosenberg's

statement may be correct, one has to wonder whether dangerousness
assessments made in this way are even less accurate and reliable than those
based on actual evidence and expert testimony.
These practical concerns, combined with the complicated legal question about
whether the statutory language of the particularly serious crime bar can be
interpreted as requiring a categorical analysis of the conviction plus a factspecific analysis of dangerousness, suggest that this may not be the best way
forward. In fact, of the three approaches discussed in this section, this one most
closely resembles the BIA's current approach, combining an examination of the
elements with a factual inquiry, and ultimately producing results that seem more
arbitrary, unpredictable, and unfair than either a strictly categorical or entirely
individualized analysis.
C. Applying an IndividualizedApproach

A third approach would be a completely individualized assessment of whether
a given offense should be classified as a particularly serious crime. This
assessment should be robust in the sense that no mitigating or aggravating
factors should be excluded from consideration. Offender characteristics,
including mental illness, as well as evidence of rehabilitation and dangerousness
should be taken into consideration, as these are all relevant and potentially
mitigating factors. By giving immigration judges more flexibility and the ability
to fine-tune their decisions to the specific circumstances of each case, an
individualized analysis could potentially avoid the concerns about over and
underinclusiveness that arise under the categorical approach. An individualized
"I Zardui-Quintana v. Richard, 768 F.2d 1213, 1222-23 (11th Cir. 1985) (Vance, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
346 In re Q-T-M-T-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 639, 670 (B.I.A. 1996) (Rosenberg, Bd. Member,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (disagreeing with the majority's contention that such
a determination of dangerousness was an onerous requirement).
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analysis would also be consistent with UNHCR's interpretation of Article 33(2)
347
of the Refugee Convention.
At the same time, however, an individualized approach could actually
exacerbate UJNHCR's underlying concerns about consistency and fairness.
Because every case has unique facts, noncitizens who committed very similar
crimes could end up being treated very differently. Even in cases where the facts
are similar, the outcomes may be different because of the highly subjective
nature of such individualized decisions. Different judges will perceive the
seriousness of crimes differently, give different weight to various factors, and
make different assessments of credibility when testimony is provided about the
facts and circumstances surrounding the offense. This will lead to highly
subjective decisions about whether or not a crime is "particularly serious."
Allowing the determination to be so subjective can lead to arbitrary,
inconsistent, and unfair decisions. An individualized approach will also make
the particularly serious crime determination highly unpredictable, giving
defendants and their attorneys no guidance about how a given plea will affect
their eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal.
Furthermore, in the huge number of cases where the respondent is
unrepresented, detained, or both, mitigating factors may never be introduced into
evidence. This could be because the respondent is unaware of the relevance of
such factors without advice from counsel, or because the respondent lacks the
resources or ability to obtain and submit relevant documentary evidence.
Detained respondents, in particular, face significant challenges in obtaining
documents, declarations, and witnesses to testify on their behalf, especially if
they are located in remote parts of the country, far from their friends and
families. Because the burden of proof is on the respondent to prove eligibility
for asylum and withholding of removal, he or she is responsible for providing
the factual evidence to show that the particularly serious crime bar does not
apply.
It is often far easier for the Government to present factual evidence than for
the respondent. As Judge Berzon on the Ninth Circuit has noted, additional factfinding "effectively serves as a one-way ratchet that always favors the
Government.

' 348

For example, the Government often has easy access to arrest

reports, witness statements, and other documents that could paint a far worse
picture of the crime than the statute of conviction alone. Because the officers
and witnesses involved are unlikely to come to immigration court to testify, in
most cases there would be no opportunity for the respondent to cross-examine
any of these individuals, making it difficult to challenge the evidence submitted
by the Government. Because the Government tends to be in a better position to
introduce factual evidence, the individualized analysis may, as a practical

...See supra Section II.B.
8 United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915, 962 n.18 (9th Cir. 2011)
(Berzon, J., concurring), abrogatedby Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013).
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matter, give the immigration judge more flexibility in deciding that a crime is
particularly serious than in concluding the opposite.
Another drawback to an individualized approach is that adjudicators seem
uncertain about when an inquiry into the underlying facts and circumstances of
a crime, especially mitigating factors, turns into a re-adjudication of guilt or
innocence, thereby "going behind" the conviction. The BIA's decision in
G-G-S- is an excellent example of this issue. 349 Because it is possible for the
criminal court to take mental illness into consideration in adjudicating guilt and
in sentencing, the BIA held that immigration judges are constrained by how the
criminal court handled this issue.350 If mental illness was not raised as an issue
in criminal court, then, under G-G-S-, it is improper for the immigration judge
to consider it as part of the particularly serious crime determination. The flaw in
this reasoning is that the vast majority of criminal charges are resolved through
plea agreements where mitigating factors are raised behind the scenes in
negotiations with the prosecutor or not raised at all in order accept a quick plea
offer and remove the risk of further detention or a more severe sentence. 351 Thus,
the only opportunity to bring these mitigating factors to a judge's attention may
be after the conviction, when the individual is fighting the particularly serious
crime bar in immigration court. But, even if a completely individualized test
were allowed, immigration judges may be reluctant to give weight to factors that
they believe-rightly or wrongly-were already taken into consideration by the
criminal court.
Finally, adopting an individualized approach would not provide the efficiency
of the categorical approach. Judges would have to take the time to examine
documentary evidence, listen to testimony, and try to make sure that they take
all relevant facts into consideration. In cases where the assessment was highly
efficient because little evidence was provided, the individualized approach
likely would not be protecting the interests of the respondent. Thus, the key
benefits of the categorical approach-consistency, predictability, and
efficiency-would all be lost with an individualized analysis, while also
potentially sacrificing fairness due to an imbalance of knowledge, power, and
resources between the parties.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
All three of the approaches discussed above--categorical, a combination of
categorical and factual analysis, and completely individualized-raise concerns
about fairness, consistency, and notice. In the context of immigration
adjudication in the United States, however, the categorical approach comes
closest to satisfying these principles. The absence of counsel; high rate of
In re G-G-S-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 339, 347 (B.I.A. 2014).
Id.
351 See Fatma Marouf, Assumed Sane, 101 CORNELL L. REv. ONLINE 25, 30 (2016)
(discussing the incentive that defendants have to plead guilty even when it has adverse
immigration consequences).
149

350
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detention; speed with which detainees are moved through the court process; and
concerns about institutional competence, all make it difficult to produce the type
of evidence needed to support individualized assessments. Most people facing
deportation in the United States simply cannot afford the high cost of litigating
an individualized issue that often requires expert testimony, psychological
evaluations, and voluminous documentation in order to prevail. The categorical
approach relieves noncitizens of this evidentiary burden. It also relieves courts
of litigation that tends to have a low return. At the end of the day, the meaning
of the documents submitted "will often be uncertain," and the facts they contain
"may be downright wrong. ''352
However, it would be a mistake to view the categorical approach as "neutral."
One of the common critiques of the categorical approach is that it can provide
an undeserved windfall for immigrants by narrowing the judicial inquiry and
keeping out bad facts. 353 But, as discussed above, this approach can also benefit
the Government by keeping out facts that favor the immigrant. 354 Confusion
among judges about how to apply the categorical approach also tends to cut
against unrepresented immigrants who are ill-equipped to make legal arguments
355
disputing the Government's interpretation.
One way to try to mitigate the limitations of the categorical approach is to
adopt a burden-shifting framework for the particularly serious crime bar. This
type of burden-shifting approach is already applied in many other areas of
immigration law, such as establishing removability; 356 showing a well-founded

352

Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2289.

313See Evan Tsen Lee, Mathis v. U.S. and the Future of the CategoricalApproach, 101
MiNN. L. REv. HEADNOTES 263, 269 (2016) (explaining the ideological argument against the

categorical approach as a "windfall" for immigrants that allows the immigrant to "escape his
just deserts merely because some hypothetical defendant could be convicted under that statute
for conduct that would not fit the standard").
314See Martinez v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 413 F. App'x 163, 167-68 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding
an alien's conviction for child neglect to categorically constitute "crime of child abuse" in a
"heartbreaking case" and calling the result "profoundly unfair, inequitable, and harsh")
355See Lee, supra note 353, at 265-68 (stating that lower federal court judges are
"completely confused" by the categorical approach).
356 Under the INA, the Government must first establish removability by clear and
convincing evidence. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2012). The burden then shifts to the
noncitizen to establish relief from removal by a preponderance of the evidence. 8 C.F.R.
§ 1240.8(d) (2017); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A).
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firm resettlement bar to
fear of future persecution; 357 determining whether the
359
35 8
asylum applies; and even proving U.S. citizenship.
There are different ways to apply this burden-shifting approach. For example,
the Government could bear the initial burden of establishing a rebuttable
presumption that the categorical approach triggers the particularly serious crime
bar. Then, the noncitizen could have an opportunity to rebut that presumption
by a preponderance of evidence that the crime was not particularly serious based
on individualized facts. This approach would provide a way to push back against
an application of the categorical approach that produces unfair results for the
immigrant. Although it would not provide the same level of predictability as a
purely categorical approach, the use of a presumption would provide greater
predictability than the BIA's current haphazard approach.
Some might argue, however, that this application of a burden-shifting
framework does not help prevent windfalls for immigrants. In order to address
that concern, courts could alternatively allow either party to rebut the
presumption established by the categorical approach. Allowing either party to
rebut a presumption is not uncommon. For example, a criminal sentence that
falls within the range permitted by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is
presumed reasonable, but either party can rebut that presumption by
demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable in light of other factors listed in
the statute. 360 Similarly, here, the result of a categorical analysis could be
presumed to provide a reasonable determination regarding whether a crime is
"particularly serious," but either party could be allowed to rebut that
presumption by introducing individualized facts showing that the result of the
categorical approach is unreasonable.
Currently, one of the greatest concerns about the categorical approach is that
the most recent cases at the time of this writing suggest its future is uncertain. In
351 "An applicant who has been found to have established such past persecution shall also
be presumed to have a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of the original claim.
That presumption may be rebutted if an asylum officer or immigration judge makes one of
the findings described in paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section." 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b).
358

See Maharaj v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 961, 972, 976-77 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc)

(explaining that the Government bears the initial burden of showing an offer of permanent
resident status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent resettlement in a third country;
once the Government provides evidence of such an offer, the burden shifts to the applicant to
show that the nature of his stay and ties was too tenuous, or the conditions of his residence
too restricted, for him to be firmly resettled).
359 See Scales v. INS, 232 F.3d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that "[e]vidence of

foreign birth... gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of alienage," shifting the burden of
proving citizenship by a preponderance of the evidence to the individual).
360 See United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th Cir. 2006) ("[A] sentence that is
properly calculated under the Guidelines is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of
reasonableness. This is a deferential standard that either the defendant or the government may
rebut by demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable when viewed against the other
factors delineated in § 3553(a).").

1484

BOSTON UNIVERSITYLA WREVIEW

[Vol. 97:1427

Mathis v. United States, 361 decided in 2016, the Supreme Court upheld the strict
application of the categorical approach in determining which prior convictions
count toward enhanced sentences for federal crimes. 362 But the Court was
surprisingly split five to three in that case. Justice Breyer and Justice Ginsburgwho were part of the eight-to-one majority in Descamps--dissentedin Mathis,
critiquing the majority's approach as "not practical" and noting that "there are
very few States where one can find authoritative judicial opinions that decide
the means/elements question. '363 This characterization of the categorical
approach contradicts the reasoning in Descamps and other decisions finding that
the categorical approach helps avoid the "practical difficulties and potential
3' 64
unfairness of a factual approach.
While Justice Kennedy concurred with the majority in Mathis, his opinion
also criticized the categorical approach for producing "arbitrary and inequitable
results," at least with respect to the sentencing scheme at issue in that case. 365
These concerns appear to be related to situations where the categorical approach
results in "windfalls" for the noncitizen. Justice Kennedy not only urged
Congress to take action, but also concluded that the Court should "revisit its
precedents in an appropriate case," opening the door to overruling cases such as
Descamps.366 If Justice Kennedy swings to the other side, the categorical
367
approach could be in jeopardy.
Given the ambivalence of at least three Justices on the Court about how the
categorical approach works in practice, it is important to identify areas of law
where the categorical approach would help, rather than hinder, predictable and
consistent decision-making. The BIA's decisions on the particularly serious
crime bar provide a compelling example of one such area. Before scrapping the
categorical approach, courts should take a long, hard look at the arbitrary and
inequitable outcomes that are reached in this exceptional situation where the
categorical approach is not applied.

361 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016).

362 Id. at 2248 (declining to find an exception to the categorical approach under the Armed

Career Criminal Act).
363 Id. at 2263-64 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
364 Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601 (1990); see also Descamps v. United States,
133 S.Ct. 2276, 2289 (2013).
365 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2258 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
366 Id.

367 Another recent decision holding that the absence of a jurisdictional element is
immaterial in applying the categorical approach resulted in an unconventional five to three
split among the Justices, with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Alito,
and Kagan in the majority and Justices Thomas, Breyer, and Sotomayor dissenting. See Torres
v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619 (2016).
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CONCLUSION

The particularly serious crime bar is the only bar to relief from removal that
is based on a conviction but not analyzed using the categorical approach. The
BIA's current approach combines the worst aspects of both categorical and
factual analysis, placing individuals facing deportation in enormous danger
based on arbitrary determinations about the seriousness of their crimes.
Applying the categorical approach to this bar would promote consistency,
predictability, efficiency, and fairness in a decision that can have the draconian
consequence of sending someone to a country where there is a serious risk of
persecution.
While UNHCR has interpreted the particularly serious crime bar as requiring
an individualized analysis, its underlying concerns about consistency and
fairness are actually better served using the categorical approach, as long as the
elements of a particularly serious crime are carefully and narrowly defined to
ensure that the principle of proportionality is not violated and that the conviction
itself signals dangerousness. Finally, applying the categorical approach would
provide a consistent mode of analysis for all particularly serious crime
determinations because the convictions that Congress has defined as per se
particularly serious crimes (aggravated felonies) are already analyzed using this
approach. Although the categorical approach is far from perfect, it is preferable
to the highly subjective nature of either a purely individualized analysis or one
that combines an examination of elements and facts. For a noncitizen facing
deportation to persecution or possible death, only an approach with objective,
predictable consequences offers any peace of mind.

